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Abstract
Cryptography can be considered as a set of algorithms which primarily relies on mathemat-
ical theories with computational supports to be practised in computer systems. Therefore,
Cryptography is employed as the main component to security solutions mainly in Internet
and could computing. Despite this, hardware and firmware implementations have failed to
securely manage program executions in computational environment. This limitation has
made it possible for hackers to carry out side channel attacks on computer systems and steal
sensitive cryptographic components, such as the secret keys, which are used in securing
communication channels. Such issues are alarming, and crucial, and therefore obligate the
detection and identification of attackers of the systems.
In this thesis, side channel attacks, exploiting the weakness in hardware and firmware im-
plementations, are addressed along with existing counter-measures. The current side-channel
attack techniques show that attackers can exploit the micro-architecture vulnerabilities to
achieve their goals. The recent Meltdown attack for instance misuses program execution
attributes such as “out-of-order execution”, through a Flush and Reload mechanism, to break
the logical isolation between the memories of two independent processes in the kernel space.
Furthermore, in this work, a real-time detection and identification framework has been
developed against side-channel attacks. The concept behind this is to take a course of
program phase analysis to extract Malicious Loop (ML) phases at the processor core level.
Unlike previous works, the proposed detection system within the framework does not rely
on synchronisation between the attackers and the victim. Instead, it banks on the Hardware
Performance Counters (HPC) utilisation, which is a hardware feature built-in to the modern
computational environments. The framework offers high accuracy and efficient detection
of Flush+Reload activities before the attacker completes the malicious task. Moreover, the
detection can be achieved with minimum time required to detect the attack(s) in both native
and cloud systems at the same cost. Additionally, the framework benefits from very low
overhead performance approximately less than 1
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Cloud computing is a client server configuration that uses services which are available on the
Internet to enable its users to access technologies with no need for the users to understand
either the technologies or the services themselves that allow their delivery. The range offered
by cloud computing models means that the cloud provides a computational environment of
great richness through which the users can access the applications that they require at any
time and wherever they may be. The hardware resources can be scaled up as required and the
cloud offers unparalleled flexibility, allowing for a quick response to the user’s requirements
with no intervention by the users’ IT managers. Set against this is the drawback that the ease
with which the cloud can be accessed increases the possibility of threats, both to resources
that are being shared with others and to the computing environment itself. The essential point
of the cloud is that it makes hardware and software services available to users in a way that
allows the applications to be continuously available to meet the end-user needs. However,
the integrity and protection of data becomes a key issue, particularly when, as it is usually
the case, the data is manipulated and the hardware is outsourced by a third party, the cloud
provider, in a location which is not disclosed to the end user. In brief, the data manipulation
and hardware security are outside of the control of the data owners and the data, which for
most companies and organisations are critical asset, - are vulnerable to data leakage attacks.
This chapter will set out the importance of this research and will provide the aims and
objectives of the research in addition to the research questions.
1.1 Motivation
The internet in general, and cloud computing in particular, is increasingly in use on a variety
of devices, both desktop and mobile. These devices outsource the end users’ privacy to the
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cloud. As a result of this, the data is exposed to a number of threats, and maintaining the
data and keeping it safe from attackers is a challenging task. The most important role in
maintaining data security in all of the states that it passes through (during its transmission,
its processing and its storage) falls to cryptography. The vulnerability of the data attracts
hackers who seek, through side channel attacks, to obtain access to the data by stealing
important components of cryptography, one of which is secret keys. Previous research has
put forward a number of sophisticated techniques through which side channel attacks can
be carried out. Success makes the protection of the user data sufficiently unreliable such
that the end users either avoid using cloud services or restrict their use of cloud services.
Recent research has demonstrated that considerable use has been made of the opening for
side channel attacks and that these openings have allowed attackers to retrieve the entirety of
a security key in less than a minute on native systems and less than three minutes in cloud
systems (Irazoqui et al., 2014) and through various system settings (Irazoqui et al., 2015).
This matters because there have been some well publicised hacks in which the hackers have
stolen large amounts of data. Such attacks offer the ability to read the arbitrary memory
in which sensitive information might be stored. In addition, recent research showed that
side channel attacks affect any end-users who use devices including PC, laptop, servers,
tablets and mobiles, which support Intel, AMD and embedded processors. Furthermore,
the attacks do not care about any particular system or platform such as Windows, XOS and
any UNIX-based OSes, as cloud systems including Docker containers Xen and OpenVP are
affected by the attacks. Meltdown attacks are a case study which is where an attack can
break down the logical isolation mechanisms between the different applications which are
supposed to be securely managed by the OS. Some of the existing detection and protection
software available such as anti-viruses fail to detect side channel attacks because the attack
does not leave any traces through traditional log files. This is due to the fact that the side
channel attack code runs in user land, does not require any privileges and does not require
system calls during the program execution. However, researchers in previous studies have
showed there to be various detection (Briongos et al., 2017) and prevention (Kim et al., 2012)
techniques, and patches (Simakov et al., 2018), in both native and cloud systems. Each
response has limitations, such as the detection applying only in its native OS (Alam et al.,
2017; Payer, 2016), monitoring all VM instances, monitoring all processes in the systems
(Payer, 2016), monitoring suspicious malicious VMs and monitoring sensitive programs
such as cryptography-based applications (Zhang et al., 2016a) or the detection rely on the
synchronisation between the attacker and victims (Kulah et al., 2018). It is therefore critical
to develop an efficient and reliable framework which is able to detect and identify side
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channel attacks in native and cloud systems at the same cost, each of which requires a very
low number of samples to function accurately. This results in being able to maintain the
performance of the system while the proposed detection system is running.
1.2 Research Questions
This section provides the hypothesis of this study and sets out the research questions.
Hypothesis: A complex computational environment can be modelled and analysed automati-
cally in relation to security as defined by the user.
The following research questions will be posed in order to validate the hypothesis.
1. How feasible is it to create a new knowledge-based framework which is capable of
mitigating side channel attacks launched against cryptography algorithms?
2. Can supervised Machine Learning be used to build a classification model which is
capable of detecting side channel attacks? If yes, is it possible to achieve optimum
accuracy when detecting such attacks?
3. Is it possible to use the automated observation of processor cores to isolate the activities
which are identifying processes with malicious intent?
4. What countermeasures can be used effectively to mitigate data insecurity and the risks
that it poses to the user’s sensitive data on both native and cloud systems?
5. What impact on the occurrence of monitored events can be attributed to the CPU
workloads running independently in the computing environment?
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives
The aim of this research is to create a new knowledge-based framework which is able to
leverage hardware support in order to analyse the process activities with the aim of detecting
malicious processes which may be running in the user space. The framework should be able
to mitigate and eliminate security threats against cache memories, particularly when the
cryptography algorithms are running. Machine Learning techniques will be used as part of
this process. Adding tree-based classifiers takes the research into the search for techniques to
mitigate complex security problems. Following objectives had to be fulfilled to achieve this
aim:
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1. Propose the utilisation of Machine Learning methods as Neural Network, Decision
Trees, Random forest and k-NN in order to provide a comparison of their efficiency
and accuracy under different workloads. This work is represented in Chapter 3.
2. Through an examination of CPU component usage, examine user programs’ execution
attributes to extract program phase of malicious programs.
3. Propose a new mechanism for process identification in order to detect the attackers
when malicious processes are present in the system to avoid performance overhead.
This work is represented in Chapter 4.
4. Propose minimum hardware-assisted PMU custom settings to observe the process
activities in the CPU, which will also help to determine other security vulnerabilities.
This work is represented in Chapter 4.
5. Suggest that different attacks may have behaviours which are reliant on different events.
This work is represented in Chapter 4.
6. Describe the micro-architecture of modern CPU in the way that it permits comprehen-
sion of the attack as well as the Performance Monitor Units (PMU) which are capable
of supporting the detection models of side channel attacks. This work is represented in
Chapter 3 and 4.
7. Use Hardware Performance Counters (HPC) to provide an overview of the program’s
execution in the user space. This work is represented in Chapter 3 and 4.
8. Examine the program phase analysis which emerges detection and identification of
malicious processes. This work is represented in Chapter 4.
9. Analyse the machine learning techniques introduced in side channel attack detection
by different studies. This work is represented in Chapter 2 and 4.
10. Design and implement a model which incorporates the analysis of the detection
techniques to make accurate and reliable side channel attack detection. This work is
represented in Chapter 4.
11. Evaluate the accuracy of the detection system by testing it with SPEC CPU 2006
benchmark suit. This work is represented in Chapter 4.
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12. Deploy the detection system on the host OS and evaluate the energy efficiency and
performance of the host OS along with the detection system operations. This work is
represented in Chapter 4.
1.4 Chapter Outlines
1. Chapter Two presents a discussion of the existing literature on side channel attacks
from their first use against cryptographic algorithms until now. Vulnerable points
in hardware and software that have been exploited by attackers to steal sensitive
information will be described, as well as a number of existing countermeasures for
mitigation and prevention of side channel attacks. Points for and against existing
countermeasures will be discussed. Finally, research gaps and limitations in the
literature will be itemised.
2. Chapter Three sets out the background detail required to understand typical CPU
architecture in a manner descriptive of the intercommunication between cache mem-
ories and the CPU in a way that it reinforces the description of side channel attack
techniques. The state of data and its importance will be described, as will be the core
technologies making the cloud vulnerable to side channel attacks. Instrumentation
used in both attack and defence will be described. This chapter also demonstrates the
ability of machine learning methods to detect malicious loops that can be used for
side channel attacks (Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe), which rely on synchronisation
between the attacker and victim.
3. Chapter Four sets out the challenges and motivations and the key intuition on which
this study’s approach is based. The framework design will also be explained. This
chapter also explores a range of machine learning techniques and addressed the lim-
itations of single decision tree algorithms in the context of our work. Finally, This
chapter details the illustration of the identification phase, including a brief background
of interrupt handlers and the way they work with HPCs.
4. Chapter Five summarises the research, draws conclusions and suggests fruitful av-
enues for future studies.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
A number of studies have shown it is possible to carry out side channel attacks on CPU
components and sensitive applications through the use of user credentials and compromising
technologies. This chapter, firstly, provides a necessary background on the current technolo-
gies which manage and transfer digital information from front to back end services and how
they prone to side channel attack. Secondly, summarises the literature from the previous
studies into the use of techniques and mechanisms both to conduct side channel attacks and
to counteract them. Also explored is the attitude of the hacker and their intention in the
use of a number of approaches for exploitation of up software and hardware, with a focus
on components that attackers have targeted and compromised. At the end of the chapter,
we review the gaps in research into presently available countermeasures and discuss those
countermeasures’ limitations, then address them and link them with the sections of the thesis.
2.1 Background
This section charts the vulnerabilities to leakage in CPU architecture, technologies, and data
and describes current side channel attacking techniques and the countermeasures available to
defeat them.
Weaknesses in hardware and software can be exploited by using leakage of information in
a channel-based attack to generate communication between two processes that share physical
resources but should not communicate with each other; the environment may be virtualised
or non-virtualised.
The lion’s share of such attacks has been shown in recent studies to target cryptosystems
through the exploitation of poor software standards and by improper use of physical resources
in a shared environment. What causes attacks on cryptosystems is that they are necessary
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components in data protection in a client/server and cloud environment (as mentioned in
2.2.3) as data passes through untrusted communication channels and/or is processed in
untrusted computing environments. The heavy reliance of such environments on co-residency
and shared features raises the likelihood that attackers will find themselves next to a target’s
neighbour under virtual isolation, increasing vulnerability to computational analysis.
Where side channel attacks take place on native systems where cloud computing is
becoming mainstream, and the attacks are low level, it becomes clear that side channel
attacks are easy to mount in the Cloud.
2.1.1 Data State and Vulnerabilities
Clearly, data is one of any organisation’s most important assets. To understand the dangers
inherent in data leakage, a definition is needed of exactly what is meant by “data” in
computing environments. According to Shabtai et al. (2012) data passes through three stages
in the processing cycle: Data-At-Rest (DAR), Data-In-Use (DIU) and Data-In-Motion (DIM).
These three stages embrace everything that happens to data from the moment of its creation
through its processing (which may involve a number of computing resources) to the point
at which it is transmitted through the cloud. The hardware resources in which data may be
found include files, the content of memory, and packets transmitted over a network, and the
representation of the data in each of these resources is different. As Table 1 shows, there have
been data leakage attacks in recent years in every one of the possible data states (Chen et al.,
2010; Ristenpart et al., 2009; Stolfo et al., 2012; Yarom and Falkner, 2014), The subsections
following contain explanations of data states and the threats applicable at each of these states.
The main focus will be on data leakage attacks while the data is in the in-use stage (DIU).
2.1.1.1 Data-At-Rest
In the DAR state, data is in storage. A computer’s hard disk constitutes a permanent data
storage, and DAR is the stage at which the data is in such a device. One concern that arises
in connection with cloud computing is transparency of the data’s location as a result of the
way that the complexity of the infrastructure making up the cloud is hidden from cloud
consumers – a cloud consumer is not aware of where their data is stored. Some organisations
considering migrating to the cloud hesitate as a result of this lack of transparency, which
causes them concern about who may be dealing with data that is sensitive to them. There are
also concerns on the part of consumers about the action of others who may be co-located
on the same storage device with malicious intent. (Ristenpart et al., 2009) indicated the
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possibility of a covert channel attack, hard disk-based, against arbitrarily selected VMs on
the Amazon cloud facility, EC2. They supported this suggestion by successfully identifying
co-residents in cloud storage and demonstrating the transmission of data between VMs when
accessing shared storage devices.
Concerns also arise over the way that, to counteract the limits on space available in main
memory, the operating system will deal with large files by loading part of the file (with
contiguous pages) into main memory while the rest of the file stays on the system’s storage
device where it has the same physical addresses as those from which the file originated.
Bernstein (2005) showed how this feature could be exploited in the construction of a covert
channel attack that would use time variation to identify those parts of the file already loaded
and those still on the disk. This works because it takes less time to access recently accessed
parts of the file than to access those that have not been touched recently.
2.1.1.2 Data-in-motion
DIM (Data-in-motion) describes the data as it is transferred over a network from source to
destination. In this condition, data is at risk from eavesdropping attacks which can inspect
packets. Cryptographic technology such as Secure Shell (SSH) has been developed to protect
the data at this point in its cycle, but the data is not fully protected against information
leakage. Song et al. (2001) demonstrated an example of a leakage attack on packages being
carried on the network – specifically in that case, looking for the password. That study
developed a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and an algorithm to predict the sequence of key
presses by the target, the keys in question being the password.
Software as a Service (SaaS), is using cloud systems to enable the delivery of applications
through the web to end users. The data while in the DIM stage will be client/server requests
and responses, and needs protection from eavesdropping attacks. The protection will be in
the form of encryption, but that is also not a complete protection against hostile attacks, as
attackers will still be able to analyse the packet size and timings in order to extract sensitive
information (Chen et al., 2010).
2.1.1.3 Data-in-Use (DIU)
The Data-in-Use (DIU) state occurs when data has been loaded into a computing resource.
For the most part, the resource in question will be a component of a CPU – perhaps a
register, perhaps a cache, perhaps main memory. When data is loaded into a CPU register
from a storage device, it will normally have to pass through a number of hierarchical
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buffers which will include main memory and CPU caches (L1, L2 and L3) before it reaches
the registers. Once there, it is prepared for read/write operations (among other possible
operations). Depending on the application in question, the data alignment and organisation
can vary according to data type as it is loaded into main memory. Possibilities include lists,
linked lists, arrays, class, and structure. Physical resources in multitasking environments
are shared between processes that occur in different layers. Examples would include the OS
layer for page sharing and the application layer for shared libraries. The data will be used by
those resources frequently, and so the operating system alternates the use of those resources
by processes so that a memory region is shared between processes – an AES buffer lookup
table would be an example (Bernstein, 2005). Research recently has shown that data in
multitasking systems is vulnerable in the DIU stage in both the OS layer (e.g. page sharing)
(Gruss et al., 2015a; Suzaki et al., 2011), the achieved memory deduplication attack, and the
application layer (e.g. shared library) Irazoqui et al. (2014). The main focus in this study is
on the DIU state.
2.2 Core Technology Vulnerabilities in Cloud Systems
Cloud computing is a combination of existing technologies including the web, cryptography
and virtualisation to provide companies and organisations and enterprises with optimum
solutions. Technologies may be wide-ranging in the domains they serve, with the health sector,
education, government, social networks and e-Commerce all well represented. The fact
remains that combining technologies in cloud-based data handling introduces vulnerabilities
capable of being exploited by attackers seeking to steal sensitive data for malicious purposes.
A list will now be provided of common cloud technologies that have been compromised in
data leakage attacks.
2.2.1 Web Technology
In SaaS (Software-as-a-Service), applications are delivered online to web clients. Web
technology is a client/server configuration that enables communication over networks. Most
desktop applications have today been converted to web applications thanks to their ease
and low installation cost, user-friendly interface, and no update required from the client.
The platform is independent and continually being technologically enhanced. All the end
user needs is a web browser to provide communicate with the server. The drawback is that
this communication takes place through networks, which carry the danger that they may
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reveal sensitive information such as data, application states and state-transits. Encryption is
needed to protect this information from network sniffers, but this does not prevent the theft
of information. Chen et al. (2010) showed the continuing viability of sensitive information
leakage.
2.2.2 Virtualization Technology
Virtualisation Technology (VT) begins with actual physical hardware resources (CPU, RAM,
IO and network) and from them creates a number of virtual machines (VMs), each of which
appears to have (is visualised as having) a physical presence with its own hardware and
operating system. Each VM is ascribed appears logical isolation and appears to be an
independent part of the system. Each VM runs on top of an additional layer called the
hypervisor, of which the chief responsibilities are to monitor and manage shared resources
between VMs through a sandboxing technique in such a way as to maintain security. VT
amplifies discrete hardware resources to serve many VMs. The primary feature is a memory
sharing memory technique, which has been widely developed by VT-based software designers
for greater memory efficiency; an example is Kernel Same Page (KSM) in KVM. This does,
though, significantly impact the security of the system, particularly in regard to data leakage
attacks. Opportunities to build hidden communication channels make it possible for nefarious
VM operators to exploit hardware vulnerabilities, leading to information leakage in which
data exchange is performed through unauthorised and illicit processes. Security threats are
endemic to the VM system, which is especially susceptible to data leakage attacks.
2.2.3 Cryptography
Cryptography is in effect a set of algorithms relying primarily on mathematical theories
computationally supported for use in computer systems. Cryptography as the chief component
in a number of security solutions is designed to be compromised, It is used widely in a number
of domains as a data protection solution against third parties planning to steal credential
information with malicious intent. Application may be multi-use by the operating system
layer or application layers, and it is suitable for a variety of purposes including email services,
banking, health records, and encrypted stored data.
As an OS-level solution, it may protect data by storing it in encrypted form on a physical
storage device. During installation of a modern operating system, an optional step is to request
encryption of user files before they are stored on an internal storage device. This facility gives
cloud consumers reliability because need not be concerned about transparency of storage
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location. It is also usable at the application layer on top of the OS layer. Especially for
web applications, software designers embed cryptographic algorithms into pages to encrypt
data exchanged between client/server in response to a request in order to guard against
eavesdropping (Chen et al., 2010). This can have value in cloud-based Platform-as-a-Service
(PaaS) applications.
Although widely used in computer and cloud systems, cryptography remains vulnerable to
information leakage attacks. This study is focused on side channel attacks in native and cloud
systems, mounted to extract sensitive information like secret keys by exploiting vulnerabilities
in software implementation and/or hardware architecture, rather than through a brute force
attack based on guesswork or an attack on the algorithms’ underlying implementation.
2.3 Side-channel Attacks
Current trends especially in cloud systems, are towards shared systems, with the result that
securing execution time and shared resources have become major issues.
Recent research has shown that side channel attacks are not restricted to cryptography. In
fact, they are used to target data in such environments as: Database (Kellaris et al., 2016)
smart card (Messerges et al., 1999, 2002) BTree search algorithm (Dachman-Soled et al.,
2017) satellite (Santhanam et al., 2017), CAPTCHA (Hernandez-Castro and Ribagorda,
2010), printer (Backes et al., 2010), Web Applications (Chen et al., 2010), keystroke (Cai
and Chen, 2011; Lipp et al., 2017) and etc.
Side channel attacks have been mounted against cryptosystems to extract secret keys using
information sources instead of through Brute Force attacks or attacks against algorithms’
mathematical implementation, in which the attacker relies on being able to deduce the target’s
secret keys to obtain information, identifying those keys as non-functional properties of
program output. Methods include observation of such things as execution time, memory
usage in shared systems, and the timing and scale of encryption cycles). Popular algorithms
researched in the last ten years include RSA (Yarom and Falkner, 2014)(Aciiçmez, 2007),
AES (Osvik et al., 2006) , DES (Acıiçmez et al., 2010). Attackers monitor shared resources
to collect the fine detail information that will help identification of the usage of targeted
data by victims. The attacker does not need to be privileged in order to obtain yield the
information, as resource sharing will suffice to enable the attack.
Attackers utilise C/C++ due to the direct access to the hardware resources such as
memories in the system. Moreover, they are the language most operating systems and kernel
components are written in. Further, they are able to run assembly language directly with
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native language’s statements. Besides, they are the programming language most suitable
for areas where data leakage attack models exist. In addition, they are able to virtualise
memories into array form, especially CPU cache memories, giving greater capabilities to
programmers while dealing directly with such on-board resources.
Side channel attacks were first introduced by (Kocher, 1996). Over the past 15 years,
there has been extensive research into side channel attacks extracting cryptographic keys
through CPU caches (L1, L2 and L3 or LLC) which have been practised successfully on both
native and cloud systems. The approach has been to analyse the access time variations by
tracing use of the CPU cache
The first practical attack against a cryptographic algorithm DES was proposed by Tsunoo
et al. (2003) in 2003, taking some 1023 samples and retrieving ca 90% of the secret key.
Researchers first looked at the AES algorithm in 2005. It was practised first by Bernstein
(2005); with the attacker remotely analysing the algorithm’s overall execution time. Bernstein
also published a full implementation of the attack, which was subsequently extended and
refined by Neve et al. (2006). They addressed limitations of Bernstein’s attack and retrieved
all key bits though taking fewer samples. In a 2013 enhancement of Bernstein’s side channel
attack, Aly and ElGayyar (2013) reproduced the attack on modern CPUs with the latest
version of AES.
As cloud computing has become more popular, so has cryptography, with the focus of
researchers being to solve weaknesses of logical isolation between cloud entities existing on
the same physical machine. Ristenpart et al. (2009) addressed Amazon EC2 cloud systems’
internal hardware vulnerabilities with proposed attacks at high level and low resolution. In
2012, (Zhang et al., 2012) greatly improved resolution through the use of L1 cache, while
in 2014, Yarom and Falkner (2014) achieved a side channel attack of very high resolution
through the use of L3 combined with unrelated processes, each of which was on a different
core. LLC has since become the hardware most heavily targeted by attackers seeking to
extract secret keys (Gruss et al., 2015b)(Irazoqui et al., 2015).
A number of side channel attack techniques exist; the four most often used by researchers,
especially in cloud computing, are:
Time+Evict (Osvik et al., 2006)(Tromer et al., 2010):This technique assumes that a
shared library is linked at the same time to programs run by attacker and target; an example
would be a lookup table in AES. Each party can access the lookup table. The attacker
monitors cache line(s) synchronised with the array1 with the aim of first finding the average
time taken by a single encryption, after which the attacker triggers encryption and evicts
1The lookup table is represented as an array when it is loaded in to main memory
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those cache lines that have already touched the array. The attacker then triggers a series of
encryption, measuring each one. Any encryption call that takes longer than average is an
indication that the target recently accessed the evicted cache line(s).
Prime+Probe (Zhang et al., 2012)(Maurice et al., 2015b): This technique involves
monitoring by an attacker of the target process by filling the CPU cache with the attacker’s
data. The purpose of this is to identify attacker’s cache lines evicted by the target’s data. To
achieve this, the attacker uses a malicious loop which, in each iteration, sleeps for a specific
time to wake the attacker process and measure access time variations to its cache lines. A
longer access time shows the cache line to have been evicted by the target so that it must be
reloaded from a higher memory level. This technique works on all memory levels.
Flush+Reload (Gullasch et al., 2011)(Yarom and Falkner, 2014): This is the inverse
of the Prime+Probe technique. Both attacker and target need to be able to access the same
data concurrently (the shared library feature mentioned in 1.5.2.6). The attacker process
flushes the cache to ensure removal of all cache lines. After flushing, the attacker waits until
data is accessed by the target. The flush means that data accesses must be from higher level
memory, and the target’s data fills some cache lines. The attacker then tries to access data
from the same source as the target; a shorter access time means that the target has already
accessed the cache line in question
Flush+Reload has become an powerful technique in achieving side channel attacks against
various machine learning algorithms, exploiting OS, hardware and application vulnerabilities,
and various platforms x86 and mobile devices Lipp et al. (2016)
Flush+Flush (Gruss et al., 2015b)(Gruss et al., 2015c): Two flushes comprise this
technique, which differs from Flush+Reload in that it does not have a reload step. The cache
is thus free of misses. The attacker is relying on time variations in a series of flushes rather
than monitoring cache line accesses
2.4 Side Channel Attacks in Two Decades
There has been widespread use of several attack techniques in leaking sensitive data in cloud
systems. They are similar to techniques already described, except in the use of different
system settings and CPU architecture.
As already mentioned, one of the things covert and side channel attacks offer attackers is
the ability to interfere with underlying hardware activities and, for example, measure changes
in the time it takes to access higher level memory. This is the mechanism at the centre of
such attacks, allowing an attacker to assume the target’s credentials through resource sharing.
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What follows is a generic model for Cloud system attacks, along with the history of the past
15 years of attacks against a variety of shared resources.
Cloud components’ vulnerabilities to data leakage attacks has already been shown.
Achieving data leakage depends on how attackers view the secret keys or other targets they
are out to steal. The importance of cryptographic algorithms in real systems as a way of
encrypting data has already been mentioned, and has encouraged deployment of sophisticated
attack techniques to obtain secret keys. This attack model’s scope will be the targeting of
secret keys. Two steps are required for a data leakage attack to succeed: placement a
malicious VM, and the attack itself in cloud systems.
When the attacker has identified the data type, the next step is to locate the attack
processes on the same physical machine as the target. Placing a new VM instance in a lab
is cheaper than in such real systems such as EC2 (Ristenpart et al., 2009)(Xu et al., 2011)
because, in real systems, cloud providers try to hide cloud infrastructure’s complexity as
well as the complexity of data storage to prevent the cloud being mapped. The attacker
therefore needs further action to happen before the target can be located Ristenpart et al.
(2009) overcame this problem by establishing a covert channel attack in Amazon EC2, a
real cloud system, by using network probing techniques to reveal EC2 mapping in which
internal and external network address spaces correspond to an entity creation. This helped
the attacker in the early stages to find the internal map of EC2 in order to locate the attack
process in the same EC2 zone as the target. In this way, the possibility is created that the
attacker and the target may be on the same physical server in the same zone.
Next, the attacker uses such attack techniques prime+prob and Flush+Reload (2.4). The
attacker monitors the target’s activities on shared hardware. There has been considerable
recent research into these attacks across a range of on-board resources including CPU caches
(L1 (Zhang et al., 2012), L2 (Wang et al., 2012) and L3 or LLC (Yarom and Falkner, 2014))
and memory pages (Zhang et al., 2011). Table 2.1 shows typical attacks mapped against
physical resources.
The theft of secret keys from cryptographic algorithms relies on the nature of the algo-
rithms. AES algorithm, for example Bernstein (2005)(Briongos et al., 2016) encrypts plain
text by means of a lookup table which holds values to be used during the encryption rounds.
As the most critical of the algorithm’s components, this table has been targeted by attackers.
AES attackers look for cache contentions and cache line accesses to determine recent cache
line usage, generating candidate elements in the target’s lookup table by utilising auto timing
registers.
In the RSA algorithm (Yarom and Falkner, 2014), however, dependence on the S-Box
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is replaced by dependence on the mathematical operations square and multiply. Attackers
therefore seek to trace execution of the target’s program rather than memory accesses.
To investigate attacks against L1 cache Zhang et al. (2012) built constructed a side channel
attack using L1 instruction cache to extract AES secret keys from a target VM co-resident
with the attacker’s VM, with both VMs running libgcrypt shared library. They addressed
hardware and software noise sources against the attacking VM and could reduce the noise
during the observation stage by combining SVM with the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to
deduce key bits.
To investigate attacks against L2 cache, Ristenpart et al. (2009) introduced a cross-VM
covert channel attack against CPU L2 cache, targeting large files to transfer messages between
two VMs with the object of identifying co-resident VMs on shared storage devices. Their
interested was in hard disk contention patterns revealed by recording variations between
VMs in access time to certain portions of the files. Xu et al. (2011) improved resolution of
this attack through higher bandwidth and lower error rate.
Attackers then improved the leakage attack model through the use of L3 and other
resources, recovering entire keys in reduced times. Previous studies had shown core-sharing
between attack and target VMs to be a requirement of the attacks. Previous to 2014, L1 and
L2 cache levels were most targeted and it was necessary to pair attack and target processes on
the same core. Zhang et al. (2012) attack model used IPI interrupts to force core migration
of the target process, allocating it to the same core as the attacker process. Hoevery, Yarom
and Falkner (2014) introduced a new form of side channel attack by using L3 cache and
exploiting the inclusiveness feature. Their proposal was for a Flush+Reload technique to
extract from the GnuPG RSA implementation the private key’s components, amounting to
some 97.7% of the key. In this case, attack and target processes were on different cores but in
shared page settings. The authors successfully constructed an LLC-based channel between
two unrelated processes in a virtualised environment.
Deduplication is a key function in virtualisation, enabling the host to reclaim large
amounts of memory where contents are identical. Previous studies showed this feature to have
been exploited in cloud systems. The reason for Microsoft Azuru disabling hyperthreading
in the cloud system was the side channel attack proposed by Marshall et al. (2010). Suzaki
et al. (2011) proposed matching as a technique to identify applications (sshd and apache2)
running on Linux OS and Firefox and IE6 on Windows XP) and to discover a targeted file
downloaded by a browser on the target VM. Bosman et al. (2016) suggested a side channel
attack against Windows Edge Browser based on a Java script to retrieve an HTTP hashed
password. This vulnerability encouraged CPU makers to disable the feature, but this has
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not prevented the leaking of information against hardware resources by attackers. Irazoqui
et al. (2015) tried to overcome the leakage of information but, even when deduplication is
disabled, it remains possible. Pages of huge size were used, and the attacker was able to
obtain complete physical addresses from virtual addresses. In cache addressing, the same
physical addresses are used for cache addressing.
In shared page settings, an LLC based channel was successfully created between two
unrelated processes in a virtual environment. Deduplication is a key function in virtualisation,
enabling the host to reclaim large amounts of memory where content is identical.
Table 2.1 Side and Covert Channel Attack Classifications
Data Leakage Attack Techniques in Cloud Systems
Stat Type Tech App Res Type System Publications
DAR
CC PP – L1 File IaaS (Ristenpart et al., 2009)
CC PP – L1 File IaaS (Xu et al., 2011)
DIP
SC – DES L1 Key Native (Tsunoo et al., 2003)
CC FR – L1,2 – mobile (Lipp et al., 2016)
CC – – – – native (Kocher et al., 2011)
CC – – – – native (Messerges et al., 2002)
CC – – – – native (Picek et al., 2017)
CC – – – – native (Maurice et al., 2015a)
CC – – – – native (Aciicmez and Seifert,
2007)
CC – – – – native (Brickell et al., 2006)
CC ET – LLC – native (Brasser et al., 2017)
CC ET – LLC – native (Yarom et al., 2015)
CC ET – LLC – native (Yarom et al., 2015)
CC – – DRAM – native,
cloud
(van der Veen et al.,
2016)
CC FR – DRAM – native,
cloud
(Pessl et al., 2016)




(Gruss et al., 2016a)
– – – PTE – native (Gruss et al., 2016b)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 – continued from previous page
Data Leakage Attack Techniques in Cloud Systems
Stat Type Tech App Res Type System Publications
– – – PTE – native (Seaborn and Dullien,
2015)
CC PP RSA L1, L2 key native (Gruss et al., 2017b)
CC PP RSA L1, L2 key native (Percival, 2005)
SC PP AES L1 Key native (Bernstein, 2005)
CC SMT/FU program L2 file native (Wang and Lee, 2006)
SC SMT-
cache
AES L2 key native (Wang and Lee, 2006)
SC – RSA L1I Key native (Aciiçmez, 2007)
SC ET, PP AES Page – native (Osvik et al., 2006),
(Tromer et al., 2010)
SC PP – L1I – native (Acıiçmez et al., 2010)
CC PP browser Pages file PaaS (Chen et al., 2010)
SC ET, PP AES L3 key native (Gullasch et al., 2011)
CC PP – L2 file cloud (Xu et al., 2011)
CC PP browsers pages file IaaS (Suzaki et al., 2011)
CC PP browsers pages file IaaS (Suzaki et al., 2011)
SC PP AES L2 key native (Gullasch et al., 2011)
SC FR AES L3 key native (Irazoqui et al., 2014)
CC PP browsers pages file PaaS (Zhang et al., 2014)
CC FF RSA L3 Key IaaS (Yarom and Falkner,
2014)
SC FR AES L3 Key IaaS (Irazoqui et al., 2015)






(Hund et al., 2013)




SC FR AES L3 key native (Gülmezog˘lu et al.,
2015)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 – continued from previous page
Data Leakage Attack Techniques in Cloud Systems
Stat Type Tech App Res Type System Publications
SC PP AES L2 key IaaS (Younis et al., 2015)
SC FR AES LLC key native (Gruss et al., 2015d)
SC FR kernel LLC Memory native,
cloud
(Hund et al., 2013)
SC PP, FR AES LLC key native (Kayaalp et al., 2016)




SC – browser – JPEG IaaS-
SGX
(Xu et al., 2015)
SC – browser – JPEG native (Jana and Shmatikov,
2012)
SC RAM browser RAM JPEG native (Gruss et al., 2016b)
SC RAM browser – JPEG native (van der Veen et al.,
2016)
SC PP Btree LLC – native (Dachman-Soled et al.,
2017)




(Lipp et al., 2017)
SC FR, PP RSA cache-
bank
key native (Yarom et al., 2017)
SC PP RSA page-
fault
key native (Brasser et al., 2017)
SC PP AES L1 key IaaS (Moghimi et al., 2017)
SC FR RSA — key — (Bernstein et al., 2017)
SC FR RSA BLISS,
BLISS-
b
key — (Pessl et al., 2017)
SC FR RSA BLISS key — (Bruinderink et al.,
2016)
SC FR ECDH – key — (Genkin et al., 2017)
DIT
CC Timing database – Dataset IaaS (Stolfo et al., 2012)
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 – continued from previous page
Data Leakage Attack Techniques in Cloud Systems
Stat Type Tech App Res Type System Publications
CC – database – Dataset IaaS (Stolfo et al., 2012)
CC RSA database – Dataset IaaS (Acıiçmez et al., 2007)
SC – browser – http native (Qian et al., 2012)
2.4.1 Targeted Data Types
The following subsections will describe commonly targeted data types that can be compro-
mised by side channel attacks. Table 2.1 shows how side and covert attacks are classified by
the way they target data types against cryptographic applications and web browsers in native
and cloud systems.
2.4.1.1 Cryptographic Keys
A key is a set of letters or symbols forming a string that, when cryptographic algorithms are
used to combine it with plain text, produce cipher text; the process also works in reverse.
This is the core source of cryptographic encryption and decryption. Cryptographic keys may
be 64-bit, 128-bit, 256-bit, or some other size. A short key might be the right choice against
a Brute Force attack, because modern CPUs can have a large number of cores and it may be
possible to find the right key by checking the maximum number of possible keys in a short
time while, even with the power of the modern CPU, a long key takes a long time. Example:
it would take 150 trillion years to crack a 128-bit AES key (Penchalaiah and Seshadri, 2010)).
Keys come in different types, and to use them it is necessary to know how the algorithm
works. An AES algorithm encrypts and decrypts by use of a secret key, while the RSA
algorithm uses a private and a public key, one to encrypt and one to decrypt. An encryption
algorithm starting the generation of cyphertext by a combination of a key with plain text
meets a number of mathematical operations in sequence (the operations being, for example,
division, multiplication and mode). The algorithms most commonly used for data protection
in real systems are AES and RAS – but they are also the most attacked algorithms. Attackers
suborn the algorithms’ components and characteristics to get the results they want. AES, for
example, generates encrypted data through the use of T-Table, while RSA uses mathematical
operations. While the algorithms are executing cryptographic operations, an organised
utilisation of the CPU components. Thus, the observation of the memory transactions of the
processes which belong to the algorithms can be made easily.
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2.4.1.2 Files
Features like shared storage and service synchronisation which are everywhere in the Cloud
lead Cloud users to get in the habit of storing documents remotely on storage over which
they have no control; examples are Google Drive, Dropbox, and SkyDrive, which share
similar data methods (Chu et al., 2013). Shared characteristics of this sort can be seen in
online applications deliverable as PaaS. Recent research has looked at the weaknesses in
implementing the web applications that can lead to a data leakage attack. Percival (2005);
Ristenpart et al. (2009); Xiao et al. (2012); Xu et al. (2011) all targeted user shared storage
files by building side/covert channels through shared resources.
2.4.2 Source of Leakage
There are a number of characteristics offered by cloud technologies to offer highquality
services, such as resource pooling, multi-tenancy and rapid elasticity (Mell and Grance,
2011). However, they are vulnerable to information leakage attacks, particularly resource
sharing features, which are fundamental for cloud computing to gain sufficient performance
to lease sufficient number of cloud tenants. Consequently, studies have shown that this
feature is prevalently exploited by attackers for their malicious intentions.
Stealing sensitive data is possible at all data states (DAR, DIP and DIT) (see Table
2.1) as they all have special consideration and techniques to achieve the attacks. Data in
multitasking/users’ systems can be processed by different resources, such as CPU caches,
memory, storage and network media. Each media has its own characteristics on which the
attackers rely during experiments. So, it is crucial to focus on the common features that have
already been exploited by previous studies
2.4.2.1 CPU Architecture
Past studies showed that CPU is the most targeted resources by attackers. It is the main
physical resource in computational models due to interconnection with on-board resources
such as main memory and IO devices through buses. Modern CPUs have multiple cores
to offer more efficient performance and facilitate to accommodate a sufficient number of
programs concurrently. Each core represents a logical isolated processor inside the CPU die.
The CPU has different cache levels.
In computer systems, the size and speed of memories are ordered from small and high
to large and slow (e.g. registers, L1, L2, L3 and main memory). The main responsibility
of CPU caches is to buffer data requested from the main memory, due to the trade-off
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performance between fast-to-slow and small-to-large memories in order to supply the CPU
when it is operating on the requested data. Each core can have its own L1 and L2 caches,
or only L1 privately, while L2 is shared between two or more cores, depending on the
CPU architecture design, and cores from L3 and above are shared for all CPU cores. Ge
et al. (2016) demonstrated modern microprocessors’ architecture and their compromising to
information leakage attacks in fine-grain details.
CPU cache is the main source of information that attackers relay on to perform side and
covert channel attacks. By reviewing such attacks since last 15 years, it can be noticed that
the attackers utilised one of the cache levels as primary communication channels between
two processes (attack and victim) that provides the state of the victim process unintentionally.
Earlier attacks targeted L1 and L2 cache as communication channels between attack and
victim processes, which reside on the same core. However, core migration makes noise to
the measurement when operating system alternates assigning processes to a core (Zhang
et al., 2012). Researchers then continued to explore faster and higher bitrate attacks against
L1 in cross-core settings. Until 2014, unified cache L3 has gained most of the attention due
to higher resolution with less time required to recover sensitive information (Yarom and
Falkner, 2014).
2.4.2.2 Main Memory
Rowhammer is much used as an attack on main memory, DRAM, and depends on a memory
fault during program execution allowing an unauthorised program launched by the attacker
to change bits of DRAM cells. The OS uses these bits in the management of memory
locations. Repeated accesses of DRAM cells allow the attacker to make changes in adjacent
memory locations (Gruss et al., 2017b). by means of which the attacker is able to deduce
the target’s memory location. A number of approaches have been used to launch side
channel RowHammer attacks. Gruss et al. (2017b) used the Flush+Reload technique through
exploitation of prefetch address translation (Gruss et al., 2016a) to map virtual to physical
addresses, enabling attackers to map virtual addresses of attacker and victim to the same
physical page. Pessl et al. (2016) proposed a high-speed covert channel up to 2Mb/s using
a side channel attack across the CPU, without memory being shared. The authors bridge
between two processors by way of main memory.
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2.4.2.3 Timing
Most published side and covert channel attacks have relied on timing for their success.
Attackers are interested in hardware activities at the most basic level including the number
of cycles it takes to access a single line in L1 cache. Attackers use their own program and
data to measure the differences in time taken to access memory locations, so that they can
synchronise target data stored in the same memory in shared hardware. Modern processors
such as Intel offer hardware support, a register to capture time of all operations with high
accuracy. Intel also offers a Read Time Stamp Counter (RDTSC) instruction to read the
counter register’s value2. Attackers measure memory accesses using the RDTSC instruction
through a number of techniques including Prime+Probe (Maurice et al., 2015b)(Percival,
2005), Flush+Reload (Yarom and Falkner, 2014) and FLush+Flush (Gruss et al., 2015c).
2.4.2.4 CPU Power Consumption
Attackers monitor the power consumption of the CPU over time in order to work out
mathematical operations, on the basis that operations like multiplication and division use
more CPU components than add and subtraction. This information is helpful to an attacker
seeking to extract secret keys from cryptographic algorithms. This works because in a
computer running cryptographic algorithms the CPU executes a series of divisions and
multiplications increasing the CPU’s power consumption. The attacker is then able to analyse
power consumption variations to deduce the secret key bits (Banerjee et al., 2015; Wu et al.,
2010). This approach will not be covered in the present study.
2.4.2.5 Page Sharing
A heavily used technique is memory page sharing, which finds widespread use in OSs and
hypervisors like KVM Kernel Same Page (KSP) (8) and ESX Transparent Page Sharing
(TPS) (Arcangeli et al., 2009) The OS or hypervisor scans memory pages looking for those
in which the contents are identical in each time period, so that only one copy is kept and
the rest are removed (Pan et al., 2011; Waldspurger, 2002). In virtualisation, a hypervisor
running the same OS in multiple VMs can reclaim sufficient memory. VMWARE VMWARE
(2009) statistically showed that, if ten VMs are running, the memory saving can exceed 40%.
Take, for example, a ten page shared by two VMs (VM1 and VM2). If VM1 modifies
two pages, the OS executes a copy-on-write creating two private copies of the pages which
2RDTSC is an assembly instruction, it can be used in C and C++ in-line assembly. For more detail on how
to use RDTSC in modern Intel CPUs (Paoloni, 2010)
2.4 Side Channel Attacks in Two Decades 23
are then referred to VM1. VM2 can no longer access VM1’s private copies. This means that
each VM has two private and eight shared pages. Variations in writing time between shared
and private pages are observable by VM1. Writing on a shared page takes longer than on a
private page, with the result, as shown by previous studies, that covert channel attackers can
exploit this feature in computer (Wang and Lee, 2006) and cloud systems (Bosman et al.,
2016; Suzaki et al., 2011; Xiao et al., 2012).
2.4.2.6 Shared Library
Shared libraries are code compiled to be linkable in run time by other programs. Loading
a shared library into memory causes multiple linked programs to share the same memory
locations. Memory is thereby saved because, instead of each program needing its own copy,
only one copy is required. Shared libraries also have the advantage of easy maintenance,
since a modified library, once loaded, is instantly available to all linked programs. There
is, though, an exploitable vulnerability since a shared library shares characteristic between
processes with a negative impact on data protection. Shared library vulnerability has been
illustrated at its most visible in the use of the OpenSSL implementation of AES (Bernstein,
2005; Zhang et al., 2012). This provides a dynamic shared library libcrypto for linking
with multiple programs in UNIX-based OSs. AES uses a lookup and S-Box table, an array
of values for use during encryption rounds. If this table is used by a target during encryption,
an attacker can see which elements of the lookup table the target has recently looked up.
2.4.2.7 Kernel Address Space Layout Randomisation
Kernel Address Space Layout Randomisation (KASLR) KASLR is a layer used by host OSs
to prevent an unprivileged side channel attacker from being able to work out memory accesses
on sensitive data, but Gruss et al. (2016a) exploited the prefetch instruction mechanism to
map virtual memory addresses to physical addresses, giving the attacker information about
hierarchical pages.
2.4.3 Types of Channel attacks
Side channel and covert channel attacks have been implemented recently as two common
types of information leakage attacks. They look for hierarchical memory accesses by
analysing variations in time taken by the accesses. These two types of attacks produce similar
results, though covert channel attacks are broader than side channel attacks, and deployable
in a number of layers including network (Shah and Blaze, 2009) (Hovhannisyan et al., 2015),
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OS (Hund et al., 2013), I/O (Shah et al., 2006)(Ristenpart et al., 2009) and application (Gruss
et al., 2015a). Side channel attacks specifically target cryptosystems in order to extract secret
data through a number of routes including CPU components and OS vulnerabilities. The
following sections will describe covert channel attacks but mostly side channel attacks.
2.4.3.1 Covert-Channel Attacks
The idea of a side channel attack began with the work of Lampson (1969). in late 1969
who pointed out that communication channels between two processes could be created
for the exchange of information. The privileged, or insider process, sends information
indirectly through shared resources to the unprivileged, or spying process. This can happen
on different layers which have different transmission bit rates: OS (Xu et al., 2011), CPU
cache (Ristenpart et al., 2009), virtual memory (pages) (Irazoqui et al., 2015)and network
packets among others (Wu et al., 2015). Security such as a firewall, or an IDS (Intrusion
Detection System) will not pick up this activity because it is not visible to access control
mechanisms. Covert channel attacks are limited by the low bit rates involved and the cost of
setting them up.
In 2005, Percival (2005) studied covert channel attacks in 2005 in both L1 and L2 cache
with bit rates of 200kps and 100kps, respectively in a native system. His research led him
to the conclusion that a covert channel attack on L2 cache was more practicable than on L1
cache because process core migration makes L1 cache more noisy. In 2006, Wang and Lee
(2006) showed how to build a covert channel SMT/FU in which the attacker exploited OS
vulnerability, interfering with target progress is through the shared pool of Functional Unit
FU to interfere with the victim’s process.
In 2009, following the rise of cloud computing, Ristenpart et al. (2009) demonstrated a
functional high level covert channel attack against L2 cache with the low bit rate of 0.2bps,
while 2012 saw research by Xu et al. (2011) into exploiting the memory bus in order to
increase bit rate to 3bps, Maurice et al. (2015b) in 2015 demonstrated that limiting bit rate
between two processes formed a barrier to covert channel attacks through the uncertainty
created by a higher frequency of core migration. That study used inclusive cache L3 to
overcome the issue and found higher bit rates than in previous attacks, with 751bps on
unchanged attack settings.
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2.5 Related Work
Side channel attacks have been studied in the laboratory and in real systems over the
past twenty years. They have been practised against on on-board resources such as CPU
computational units, cache and main memories. The majority of these attacks have been
concerned with cloud systems, with an emphasis on IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), in
which the physical resources of the same machine are logically isolated across VMs. As the
cloud grows in popularity, cloud providers need a full understanding of how such attacks
threaten their privacy. Consequently, it is crucial that cloud providers and software companies
take cognisance of what resources they have that are primarily used in cloud systems that are
vulnerable to side channel attacks. In the previous sections, the past and ongoing side channel
attacks against vulnerable hardware and/or software have been outlined. The following
sections will continue the review on the detection and prevention systems used to mitigate
such attacks. Finally, the limitations of the recent studies related to the proposed framework,
as demonstrated in Chapter 4, have been summarised and linked to the coming chapters.
2.5.1 Mitigation Techniques
2.5.1.1 OS level
Recent studies have shown that Operating systems are vulnerable to side channel attacks.
CPU designers as well as software companies have responded with more efficient hardware
designs and data fetching mechanisms in order to alleviate the attacks on sensitive data. This
section will describe the proposed mitigation techniques to support OS against side channel
attacks and to note their drawbacks with consideration to the performance overheads of the
system.
Earlier research has demonstrated the achievement of high resolution (Yarom and Falkner,
2014) and very fast (Irazoqui et al., 2015) side channel attacks through a Flush+Reload attack,
which has the potential to exploit the systems characteristic page sharing, which is described
in detail in section 3.2.1. These attacks leverage the shared pages, which are utilised by OSes
to merge identical pages and to share them across online and concurrent processes (or VMs).
The content is a shared library of the same applications on the machine, such as an AES
shared library in relation to SSL implementation in Linux; the possible attacks against this
setting are detailed in section 2.4.2.5. In a drive, free space can be leased to more tenants. In
the early stages of the cloud, the cloud providers aimed to reclaim the maximum possible
amount of memory by utilising shared pages. However, the disclosure of the page sharing
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vulnerability has caused software industries and cloud providers to disable the page sharing
feature, which was previously the systems’ default setting. An example software product is
VMWare, and an example cloud provider is Amazon EC2 (Maurice et al., 2015b; Zhou et al.,
2016). To mitigate side channel attacks against page sharing, Maurice et al. (2015b); Zhou
et al. (2016) proposed the kernel space solution CACHEBAR to provide concrete protection
to shared pages across VMs in PaaS. The drawback to this proposal is the OS modifications
and performance impairment, particularly in cloud systems.
Besides, according to the memory page sharing vulnerabilities, Irazoqui et al. (2015)
showed that the usage of S$A against the LLC cache in large page settings exploited the
memory page’s vulnerability and enabled the AES secret keys to be extracted. In their study,
the attack is able to resolve the memory addresses. This is possible because in large size page
addressing, the attackers can see enough physical memory addresses to be able to identify
the victim’s most recent accessed cache addresses. The authors showed that the attack could
be defeated if large size pages were disabled and if private cache slices were supported for
each VM, thus preventing cache inferences by one VM on another. While this technique
would prevent the attacker from deducing the cache slices that the target used, the number of
large pages that outperform small pages file sizes is large. Large pages, on the other hand,
can be compromised using a RowHammer attack as Pessl et al. (2016) suggested.
In order to take advantage of page sharing to resist potential side channel attacks, Kim et al.
(2012) the proposed STEALTHMEM detection system is a technique that uses page sharing
without opening the system up to side channel attacks. STEALTHMEM protects the data
from cache-based side channel attacks using the page colouring technique. STEALTHMEM
blocks the cache lines that hold sensitive data and prevents the eviction of the data by a side
channel attack. The attackers’ observations are degraded to the point where the attacker
finds it impossible to deduce which targeted cache lines have recently been accessed by
the victim. STEALTHMEM requires that the host OS keeps a note of where the sensitive
data is assigned, and this is used for both data encryption and decryption at all levels of the
memory hierarchy, from the cache through to the system’s main memory. The price of this
defence method is an overhead that unfairly penalises non-sensitive programs, but Kayaalp
et al. (2017) has shown how to improve cache colouring in LLC so then the sensitive data is
protected without STEALTHMEM and similar software modifications being needed in the
operating system. These techniques, however, are expensive to implement. Another useful
technique against side channel attacks is noise generation, which makes the attacker unsure
what his/her observations mean. Varadarajan et al. (2014) suggested a noise generation
technique for use in L1I and L1D caches.
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Despite its optimisation features, Out-of-order 3.2.1 may cause degradation in the
timing resolution to harden the side channel, but the attack techniques seen recently could
use serialisation to overcome Out-of-order. Yarom and Falkner (2014) recommends the use
of the instructions mfence and lfence to counteract this attack. Out-of-order has, however,
counteracted a Meltdown attack. Meltdown is regarded as the highest risk side channel attack
for its ability to compromise billions of user devices from mainframes to mobiles and across
common platforms like Microsoft Windows, Linux and OSX by way of attacks through cloud
providers.
Kernel Address Space Layout Randomisation (KASLR) protects the data by ran-
domising the memory addresses so then the attackers are unable to deduce the targets’ use
of memory addresses. It is a technique that has been used in a number of ways, but Hund
et al. (2013) demonstrated a generic attack on both AMD and Intel processors in both native
and cloud settings against enabled ASLR in the host Linux and Microsoft Windows OSes.
The study identified a region between the kernel and user space where candidates might lie
using the vulnerability of the double page fault method which relies on physical addresses.
Evtyushkin et al. (2016) exploited BTB (branch target buffer) contentions to mount a side
channel attack against both user-space ASLR and KASLR. Gruss et al. (2017b) demonstrated
a successful RowHammer attack using a side channel attack (Gruss et al., 2016a) against
KASLR. Gruss et al. (2016a) enhanced the OS protection through KSALR to prevent the
leaking of address information from the host’s OS address translation layer by an unprivileged
local attacker. The method was to isolate the address space between the system processes that
manage and translate memory addresses and the user space processes. Gruss et al. (2017a)
suggested using KAISER to prevent the hardware from leaking information from the kernel
to the user programs by creating an isolation layer between the kernel and the user space.
Another way that operating systems are vulnerable is through keystroke stealing, in
which an attacker constructs the keys that the victim has pressed through the exploitation
of the kernel keystrokes when they interrupt the handler. Lipp et al. (2017) demonstrated
that the keys pressed by the target could be stolen through a web application. KeyDown
was suggested by Schwarz et al. (2017b), which fakes keystrokes, as a method of protection
against Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe.
Cleemput et al. (2012) suggested that compilers could be used against side channel
attacks if the execution time were made to be uniform by transforming the code in the
AES algorithm. This study, however, also addressed its own limitations which were the
hardware requirements, the code’s complexity, portability and performance. Crane et al.
(2015) suggested that injecting noise into the program upon execution could be used to
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achieve control-flow diversity. This study provided solutions to the limitations discussed by
Cleemput et al. (2012), but their solutions are specific to the application concerned, cannot
be generalised and can degrade system performance as well.
SGX (see 2.5.1.3) is a method of prevention that works through the hardware, to which
an element that is sensitive to data has been added. It was not long after SGX was proposed
that several lines of attack were demonstrated. SGX-based protection is expensive to execute,
generates an overhead cost and any attackers can evade it. Brasser et al. (2017) demonstrated
a side channel attack which could extract data in SGX, even when the Sanctum protection
mechanism is present.
Countermeasures proposed by other researchers include Costan et al. (2016)s proposal
for a Sanctum protection model that flushes the L1 cache while the host OS performs context
switching. Zhang and Reiter (2013) suggested that a Prime+Probe attack could be defeated
by flushing L1D/I in order to avoid data dependency. Page (2003) suggested the addition of
memory noise to the memory accesses in order to leave the attacker confused.
2.5.1.2 Application level
The application layer falls on top of the OS layer, in which any applications must access
hardware resources through OS. However, there are strong protection mechanisms in the
OS but unintentional improper software implementations can lead to security holes in the
systems. Attackers can exploit these holes in order to achieve leakage attacks. Consequently,
the researchers demonstrated how improper coding leads to the occurrence of side channel
attacks. This section describes the existing techniques, as the programming guidance, used
to protect the data against side channel attacks, particularly by making it harder for any
attackers to guess secret inputs and execution times, which is the main source that side
channel attackers utilise.
Side channel attacks have increased over the past ten years because of the weaknesses
found in implementing cryptographic algorithms (Bernstein, 2005). Cryptographic software
such as OpenSSL makes shared libraries available at the same time to multiple programs in
order to save memory space. It allows for the software libraries to be updated, but this exposes
the software to potential threats. Section (2.4.2.6) shows the library sharing mechanism in
which the look-up table is at risk of being leaked by the attackers. Protection techniques have
been developed at the application level to mitigate attacks of this sort.
Constant-Time is a form of cryptographic protection against timing-based side channel
attacks. It is application-based. Constant-Time disrupts variations in memory access through
secret elements in the cryptographic algorithms such that the attackers are unable to synchro-
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nise with the victim’s data, making it difficult for an attacker to seek out the target programs’
secret elements.
Timing-based side channel attacks work by observing variations in the execution time
of the cryptographic algorithms’ secret elements. To combat this, techniques have been
developed to make the execution times constant in both symmetric algorithms like AES
and in asymmetric algorithms like RSA (Pornin, 2016). C language is used to implement
sensitive libraries such as OpenSSL due to its fast access memory. However, Cauligi et al.
(2017) addressed the C language limitation and concluded that it is unsafe to implement such
sensitive programs. The study investigated the usage of bit-wise instead of IF statement
(Acıiçmez et al., 2007; Osvik et al., 2006) due to the fact that the use of an IF statement in
such programs causes branching. This makes it possible to measure the target programs’
execution time. The study went on to make technical recommendations to cryptographic
library developers. Bernstein (2005) demonstrated side channel attack protection through
a constant-time solution, while Reparaz et al. (2017) suggested the Dudect tool to assess
the tendency to leak information on the cryptographic algorithms and to evaluate between
constant-time slicing (Käsper and Schwabe, 2009) and vector permutation by Hamburg
(2009). The study compared the existing countermeasures with the AES T-table in an
OpenSSL implementation. Implementing such solutions is difficult, especially in embedded
systems. Coppens et al. (2009) suggested that time variations could be masked through the
use of programming techniques that would eliminate the data-dependent control flow. Shinde
et al. (2016) proposed the software-based defence of deterministic multiplexing in CPUs
supported by SGX. Implementing ECDH encryption with Curve25519 in Libgcrypt requires
the Montgomery Ladder algorithm together with a branchless formula if side channel attacks
through high-level secret-input-dependent branches and memory accesses are to be avoided.
A variety of detection mechanisms exist, and multiple researchers have suggested the use of
hashing techniques to confirm a runtime programs’ integrity in order to maintain the security
of program execution flow in an untrusted environment. Kirovski et al. (2002) combined
the hash function with cryptography, but the side channel attacks got beneath the integrity
mechanisms to go on to threaten the target security.
Bruinderink et al. (2016) proposed a technique against BLISS using 3500 samples, but
their attack only works if certain assumptions are met and if they failed to attack BLISS-b
Ducas (2014). Pessl et al. (2017), on the other hand, proposed an attack that can attack
BLISS and BLISS-b together, but it requires further actions to take place and needs 6,000
samples to mount a successful side channel attack
While solutions capable of protecting sensitive data have been suggested, they have
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failed in practice due to the impracticability of implementing constant-time high-speed AES
algorithms. Yarom et al. (2017) suggested CacheBleed as a way of eliminating noise, and this
is generated in constant-time, through the use of conflicts in the cache bank to expose secret
inputs and execution time differences. Genkin et al. (2017) carried this observation out down
to the Libgcryptlibrarys’ low-level side channel vulnerabilities in order to bypass the order-4
elements in the decryption routine in order to highlight the existence of the key-dependent
vulnerabilities.
2.5.1.3 Hardware level
A number of studies carried out over the past ten years have examined many hardware-based
vulnerabilities that have permitted side channel attacks. Most often, the hardware resource
targeted by the attackers are CPU caches. Microprocessor designers have made physical
changes to reduce the impact of such attacks. A study by Percival (Percival, 2005) into
L1 cache data leakage attacks suggested that microprocessor manufacturers should disable
cache sharing between threads and the core to prevent any data from being evicted from the
cache lines. However, by disabling cache sharing across concurrent programs, this leads to
degrading the system performance significantly.
Modern processors support the use of hardware configuration in relation to enabling
and disabling hardware settings such as multi-threading. One of the objectives of multi-
threading is to support the synchronisation between threads from the same core, and this is a
characteristic that is central to a number of side channel attacks as seen in the past. Disabling
multithreading would seem to prevent the attack (Kim et al., 2012). SEALTHMEM was
proposed in the aforementioned study as an alternative way of mitigating attacks, but Zhang
et al. (2012) demonstrated the possibility that the exploitation of L1 caches can support a
side channel attack. They showed that implementing such an attack was not straightforward,
but that it was still possible.
AES has received attention from researchers and microprocessor designers since Orange
Book chose it as an effective data protection method. Intel (Gueron, 2008) announced a
new instruction set, AES-NI, in 2008. The instruction set is executed by the processor using
the AES-dedicated hardware to accelerate performance and security (Xu, 2010), but not all
platforms and software libraries (including OpenSSL) have implemented this solution. This
means that the vulnerability is still there for the side channel attacks to use.
Cloud providers plan changes in the cloud system infrastructure. Regarding the presen-
tation of a number of side channel attacks, (Ristenpart et al., 2009)(Xu et al., 2011)(Wu
et al., 2012) preceded with a demonstration that showed that constructing a communication
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channel to separate VMs in Amazon EC2 was feasible. The demonstration included internal
hardware resource maps. The provision of dedicated instances enabled Amazon to improve
its service to cloud consumers, with an emphasis on the firm isolation of VMs from one
another. The physical resources assigned to one tenants’ VM are not shared with the other
VMs. Since 2014, (Irazoqui et al., 2015; Maurice et al., 2015b; Yarom and Falkner, 2014)
have targeted the Intel CPUs inclusive feature to create a bridge for data exchange between
processes that are not related to each other. [21] was unsuccessful in an attempt to implement
an attack on AMD CPUs thanks to differences in the processes’ inclusive behaviour. It can
be difficult to produce a physical change in a microprocessor because of the influence that
this can have on the performance of the CPU. The negative impact of this solution on the
performance of the system makes it commercially non-viable.
The majority of recent attacks have targeted the hardware vulnerabilities (of Technology,
2018,?), including the L1, L2 and LLC caches, but suggested solutions which could detect
and prevent such attacks have been proposed in both hardware and software forms. Liu et al.
(2016) suggested models for protection on LLC, which would protect the operating system
layer through the use of the performance optimisation characteristics shared by each of a
CPUs cores. They then used Intels’ recently announced cache technology, Cache Allocation
Technology (CAT), to give OS level protection against side channel attacks to the LLC.
After that, they introduced CATalyst, which combines software and hardware support in the
isolation of LLC slices. It binds each slice to a single core, preventing cross-interference by
cross-cores.
Intel has given its modern processors extended SGX to combat side channel attacks, to
reduce OS vulnerability and to prevent extraction by side channel attack on the secret keys
from the cryptographic libraries. However, in SGX, there are no specific protections at the
level of the architecture. However, Moghimi et al. (2017) suggested that CacheZoom is
capable of extracting all of the AES’ secret keys once it has obtained a reasonable number
of samples. Then, Costan et al. (2016) demonstrated the Sanctum mechanism as a way of
generating noise in the L1 cache memory as the target process carries out an enclave/non-
enclave switch. Good as it was, this mechanism could not prevent Brasser et al. (2017), who
showed that there was no interruption needed in the enclave in order to probe the cache, so
then nothing occurs to trigger a mode switch or a flushing of the cache.
Researchers have suggested to CPU designers the possibility of adding an extra bit which
could be used to signal system events or permissions. As well as software protection, Shinde
et al. (2016) suggested that the addition of an extra bit would allow the host operating system
to be notified of intended page faults so then they could avoid context switching. This is a
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response to the way that attackers send instructions to the operating system to load critical
information which is then encoded to give a definition of the systems’ current state, including
virtual and physical addresses.
2.5.2 Profiling-Based Detection Systems
Section 2.5.1 reviewed the proposed techniques and mechanisms in relation to the hardware
and software used to prevent side channel attacks from stealing sensitive data. The fact
is that these approaches and techniques have not, so far, been enough to secure sensitive
data. Consequently, this section extends the study to include existing detection systems that
are helping to detect and identify side channel attacks, particularly concerning detecting
malicious VMs in cloud systems. Detection systems primarily rely on the observation of the
attack activities by profiling the execution transactions of the side channel attack programs
and taking advantage of the unintentional memory contentions that are generated by the
attack programs.
Side channel attacks against the microprocessor components often go undetected because
the attacks, which access the system control mechanisms, are hidden. Instead of accessing
the targeted resources in a legitimate manner, the attackers exploit vulnerabilities in the
hardware design and in the way that the software is implemented. Side channel attacks
degrade system performance, and so recent research has shown that the best practice of acting
against side channel attacks is by monitoring the overall computer performance, which is the
main focus in this thesis. Researchers have used performance metrics as a way of detecting
and identifying attacks. Detection of this sort can be classified as a source or an analysis
approach.
A number of approaches have been used for side channel attack detection. Zhang et al.
(2016a) proposed statistical analysis in order to identify cache attacks, relying on CPU
cycles to monitor accessed and non-accessed cache (miss/hit) attacks. Briongos et al. (2016)
proposed monitoring for Flush+Reload attacks against the AES algorithm and the study
looked at the clflush instruction of multiple cache lines, which is the core of the attack.
Detecting attacks in that case used the CPU cycle as its primary data collection source.
Section 3.2.1 discussed the power of RDTSC as a way of detecting differences in execution
time of memory accesses to reveal which accesses were being used by the attackers with
a very high resolution. As a form of detection, the CPU clock cycle has been used as a
data vector, with which the researchers were able to separate the distinct patterns created
by abnormal activities from the normal encryption processes. Briongos et al. (2016) used
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the vectors of the observed CPU cycles to detect Flush+Reload attacks against AES using
a statistical model to detect the cache line(s) flushed by an attacker while synchronising
with the target to infer the targets look-up table. Their findings cannot be implemented in
real-life systems because unexpected workloads could trigger false positives, thus reducing
the accuracy of detection. The authors of the study suggested using machine learning to
increase detection efficiency, but this would require more than only the RDTSC feature. HPC
can provide a wide range of system events concerning the current state of program executions
which can then be fed into a machine learning algorithm, yielding more efficient and accurate
results.
Recent studies have showed that hardware-based malicious activity detection methods
principally rely on High Performance Counters (HPC)s, in which special registers are built
into mainstream processors. For more details, refer to section 4, on both data leakage and
Malware studies. HPCs provide program execution granularity with a quantum precision.
Table 2.2 shows some of the previous work which has utilised HPCs for both attack and
defence in reference to both data leakage and Malware studies, unlike (Fei et al., 2014)
which basically relies on RDTSC to collect the data in the analysis stage. Data HPC-based
profiling has a larger capacity to capture the processors’ state of various program execution
characteristics as events. This allows for the machine learning method to be more feasible in
the detection systems. Zhang et al. (2016a) proposed CloudRadar, which deploys a signature
and anomaly detection system to detect side channel and memory Denial of Service (DoS)
Attacks in cloud systems. HPCs also allow for machine learning algorithms to classify the
attack pattern in the computational environment with efficient, reliable and highly accurate
results. For instance, Alam et al. (2017) got 99% accuracy in real-time system monitoring.
Zhang et al. (2012) successfully deployed Support Vector Machine (SVM) to support setup
side channel attacks at the core level to establish an L1 channel between the attacker and
the victim. SVM reduces the potential noise from different sources. Briongos et al. (2017)
used machine learning to eliminate unstable program execution noise in relation to the
synchronisation settings between the attacker and victim.
Vogl and Eckert (2012) proposed a trapping technique using PMCs to monitor programs
at the instruction level inside VMs. The authors demonstrated the capability of the monitoring
program’s execution features by observing specific instructions inside the VMs in cloud
systems. Kayaalp et al. (2017) suggested using Relaxed Inclusion Caches (RIC) to mitigate
side channel attacks. Nomani and Szefer (2015) suggested a mechanism for detection and
mitigation by injections (integrating or hooking) into the OS system scheduler to monitor
how programs use memory as a way of detecting malicious programs. This study focused
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Feild Category Publications
SCA
Attack (Gruss et al., 2015b)(Irazoqui et al., 2015)(Gruss et al.,
2017a)(Zhang et al., 2012)
Defence (Briongos et al., 2017)(Alam et al., 2017)
Malware
Attack (Vogl and Eckert, 2012)
Defence (Wang and Karri, 2013)(Tang et al., 2014)(Demme et al.,
2013)Pfoh et al. (2011)(Schwarz et al., 2017a)(Gupta, 2017)
Table 2.2 Categorise PMU-based attack and defence for side channel and Malware studies
primarily on CPU integers and floating point units and their influence on CPU component
usage. It also used the machine learning algorithm’s Neural Network (NN) to predict which
applications would go on to be memory intensive. The fact is that NNs complexity in the
training stage degrades system performance. Zhang et al. (2016a) designed CloudRadar as
a protection system capable of detecting cross-VM side channel attacks on PaaS in public
cloud services against LLC with no hardware or software configuration settings. Their model
combines signature-based and anomaly-based detection methods and relies on the use of
hardware performance counters.
2.5.3 Summary
None of the detection and prevention techniques developed so far can prevent a side channel
attack from taking place. They can make attacks more difficult to carry out, but they
cannot stop attackers from achieving their malicious aims. This is because vulnerabilities
in the hardware and software allow the attackers to find ways around them. Ge et al.
(2017) concluded that the most commonly used current processors, including x86 and ARM
processors, are not designed to maintain security in microprocessors. Lipp et al. (2018)
suggested to microprocessor manufacturers that performance should not be the sole aim of
chip design. Instead, they should be more concerned with the security holes present when
making hidden communication channels between two entities (threads, processes or VMs) in
the computational environment to complete execution transactions securely.
What stands in the way of side channel attack mitigation is the overhead generated by
the protection methodologies and the fact that implementing the methods is complex. The
overheads in question relate to the fact that operating systems operate on one kernel space
and that applications operate on user space. OS overheads negatively impact the system.
The fact is that the majority of both of the proposed side channel attacks and the coun-
termeasures against them are reliant on assumptions. Enabling and disabling features is
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an example. It follows that building a reliable security model requires the study of the
vulnerabilities that attackers exploit and it notes the limitations in reference to the abilities of
the existing countermeasures to provide security tailored to specific situations.
2.6 Limitations of Existing Works or Summary and Re-
search Gaps
This chapter is a review of the recent work in order to reveal the most up-to-date best
practices in side channel attack detection, addressing the limitations in the previous work
on the subject. Commercial anti-virus software has had limited success in detecting side
channel attacks. This is because the characteristics of such attacks are that they do not require
privilege in order to succeed and utilise system calls. They instead rely on observing the
effect of their own program executions on the same shared hardware and software resources.
A side channel attack’s primary aim is to discover vulnerabilities leading to the detection of
data-dependency in secret elements. Computational noise in the CPU makes it difficult to use
basic side channel attacks. Because researchers continually propose countermeasures when
new forms of side channel attacks emerge, attackers are beginning to employ more than one
technique to achieve their malicious intentions Kocher et al. (2018); Lipp et al. (2018).
In spite of the recent detection systems proposed to detect side channel attacks, they
are liable in relation to one or more factors which indicates the efficiency and accuracy
detection. In the following sub-section, the most recent relevant works regarding the proposed
framework in this thesis have been listed according to the general detection framework
components.
Profiling: Zhang et al. (2016a), Payer (2016) proposed the use of the perf tool against
side channel attacks by monitoring existing processes in the system. Zhang et al. (2016a)
selected VMs at random to monitor, while Payer (2016) monitored all processes in the system.
The fact remains that side channel attackers can escape observation because the use of perf
in both studies depends on the file system proc to retrieve information about the system’s
existing processes. A case study on Malware attacks Wang and Karri (2013) demonstrated
the feasibility of an attacker modifying the proc file to hide its process id from the system
so then perf gained no information about the malicious processes. In this paper, on the
other hand, we have proposed a system profiling mechanism that targets the processor cores
instead of the proc file system, so then all program execution transactions appear on the
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observation. This means that the attackers cannot escape observation. This limitation is
addressed in section 4.13
Native and Cloud systems: Alam et al. (2017) and Chiappetta et al. (2015) proposed
detection systems using the machine learning approach to detect side channel attack in native
systems. However, they failed to detect malicious VMs in cloud systems. Zhang et al. (2016a)
setup a detection system in cloud settings, but their detection system worked only under
certain conditions. For instance, the system requires dedicated hardware to be employed for
the detection system and the signature of the cryptographic applications in VMs must be
recorded. Fei et al. (2014) proposed a detection system in both native cloud systems, but
the cost of VM detection was higher due to the extra analysis needed. Our work proposes
a detection mechanism of ML in both native and cloud systems without an additional cost
concerning the cloud systems.
This limitation is addressed in sections limitation is addressed in section 4.12 and limita-
tion is addressed in section 4.13
Synchronisation: When the side channel attack uses hardware resources such as CPU
cache memory, it basically relies on memory contentions in the repetition manner which leads
to unintentional contentions. The attackers are unaware of this, and this causes significant
abnormal activities. This can be easily detected by utilising a synchronisation approach. This
means that the attack processes can be detected by relying on the data collected by the victim
(Kulah et al., 2018). This approach is vulnerable in two potential circumstances. First, Allaf
et al. (2017) studied a comparison of multiple machine learning algorithms, namely ageis
SPEC cpu2006 int and fp application, in order to stress the CPU cache memory. As a result
of this, heavy workloads have a negative impact on the detection accuracy of three machine
learning algorithms including DT, PCAANN and k-NN. All algorithms performed well when
no workload was running, with int applications such as gcc and bzips degrading the accuracy.
With fp, the accuracy got worse.
Second, there might be smart side channel attacks deploy to evade the defence systems
by slowing down the observations in order to produce irregular unintentional contentions by
the attack programs. Allaf et al. (2018) proposed a detection mechanism that does not rely
on the synchronisation approach. Instead, it monitors the scheduling quantum of each CPU
cores in the system. The proposed detection requires a very low number of samples to detect
and identify the attackers.
Previous works also showed that their detection system requires synchronisation. In this
setting, both the victim and attacker programs are monitored to detect data dependencies
while the attacker program is channelled with the victim programs to force the system to
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trigger hardware contentions Alam et al. (2017); Briongos et al. (2016); Chiappetta et al.
(2015); Payer (2016). The proposed detection systems are vulnerable for the reasons below.
Firstly, in the case where other normal programs use the same shared library as the victim,
such as AES in the implementation of OpenSSL, the unintentional hardware contentions are
feasible when multiple programs (or users) are accessing the same shared library at the same
time. This leads to data dependencies. Thus, the normal programs are detected as an attacker.
Second, out of the workloads used in the test data-set, there is a negative impact on the
detection accuracy (Allaf et al., 2017). Particularly, Gulmezoglu et al. (2017) proposed a
detection algorithm to detect the attack by collecting L1 data. Intensive workloads degrade
detection accuracy.
Third, in the case of smarter attacks, Gulmezoglu et al. (2017) stated that they can be
evaded and the attack will be mis-classified. In the proposed framework, even if the attacker
slows down the attack, the attacker can still be detected unless they slow down to a degree
that cannot be beneficial in detecting any dependencies. This limitation is addressed in detail
in section 4.12
Machine learning: In the previous works Alam et al. (2017); Allaf et al. (2017); Chi-
appetta et al. (2015), the utilisation of supervised machine learning algorithms needs to be
trained for each of the cryptographic algorithms across existing attacks. However, Briongos
et al. (2017) used unsupervised machine learning to detect side channel attack activities
regardless of what techniques were used. The detection system incorrectly detected normal
users, as mentioned in the previous section, who use the same cryptographic algorithm as the
victim. Unlike the previous work, the proposed detection system uses supervised machine
learning to detect side channel attack activities using the phase detection approach. The
details have been given in section 4.3. This limitation is addressed in detail in section 4.12.
Performance: The performance overhead is the central issue affecting system per-
formance in reference to any potential detection methods. System overheads need to be
considered, and can be classified as either an OS-based overhead or an application-based
overhead. An OS overhead is much more expensive than an application overhead. Nomani
and Szefer (2015) recommends injecting a machine learning algorithm into OS scheduling
to monitor CPU component usage to detect malicious processes. Cloudradar Zhang et al.
(2016a) employs and dedicates three processor cores to monitor malicious processes. Payer
Payer (2016) continuously monitors all existing processes. These mechanisms incur over-
heads in the host system. In the proposed framework, instead of injecting machine learning
algorithms at the OS level, the detection system is placed in the user space and only data
collection is placed in the kernel space. The proposed framework does not monitor the
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whole processes in the system, and it instead profiles the processor core executions. Finally,
the proposed framework does not require dedicated hardware and OS configurations. This
limitation is addressed in detail in section 4.12.6.
Chapter 3
Preliminaries - Synchronous Trace-based
Detection
3.1 Introduction
Data sensitivity is of increasing importance, and this is particularly true in cloud computing.
The primary use of cryptographic techniques on the internet and in cloud systems is to protect
sensitive data such as, among other types, patient records, banking transactions and social
web accounts and posts. However, there have been consequent attacks designed to steal
sensitive data that target critical cryptographic elements as secret keys, look-up tables and
mathematical operations including square multiplication. AES, as an example, has been
developed to protect data in a variety of domains including native and cloud systems. There
has been a good deal of research into the use of side channel attacks on AES algorithms
(Irazoqui et al., 2014).
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are two main attack techniques, namely Flush+Reload
and Prime+Probe, making the use of malicious activities performed during the attack stages.
The attacks mainly target Last Level Cache (LLC). This is because LLC provides high
bit rates to transfer the largest amounts of data as possible. However, there are different
approaches that have been used in detecting such attacks such as statistical, probabilistic Fei
et al. (2014) and machine learning approaches (Alam et al., 2017). For more detail, refer to
section 2.5.
Fei et al. (2014) proposed a statistical analysis of the cache access driven attacks which
rely on CPU cycles to monitor accessed and non-accessed cache-based (miss/hit) attacks.
Briongos et al. (2016) suggested detection based on FR attacks against AES by analysing
the flush instruction of the multiple cache lines which form the core of the attack. Their
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model relied, for the most part, on the CPU cycle as a primary source for data collection. In
another approach, the PMU registers were used to give greater granularity so then the features
supporting the detection mechanisms could be extracted at a higher resolution. Zhang et al.
(2016a) proposed CloudRadar, where the detection of signatures and anomalies were used to
detect existing and new forms of side channel attacks as well as other cache attacks such as
the denial of service attacks against CPU caches. The proposed framework requires dedicated
resources to support detection. However, the proposed framework in this chapter does not
require any additional resources.
It is the expectation that HPC provides more program execution features to investigate
the attack activities. Therefore, machine learning algorithms can emerge to analyse complex
data efficiently by detecting the attacker’s malicious behaviour in the system. As the use
of machine learning has been studied in a variety of domains, with particular emphasis on
anti-virus work to protect individual computers, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) used to
provide greater network security and spam detection to improve the security of information
have emerged. Machine learning methods enable computers to build a data-driven model and
to discover significant patterns of interest in the available data. We therefore have proposed a
study to demonstrate the use of machine learning approach in detecting side channel attacks
and how efficient is it in detecting side-channel attacks while they are synchronised with
its victims. We then compared the three popular machine learning methods (NN; C4.5; and
k-NN) to establish machine learning-based detection approach in order to demonstrate which
will achieve the highest classification level in order to detect such attacks, followed by the
impact of various workloads on detection accuracy.
3.2 Background
This section examines the previously suggested techniques and methods for both attacks and
the detection of attacks, for which a number of approaches have been used. This section
also examines the most important of the key components involved in attacks and in defence
against attacks.
3.2.1 CPU Architecture and Components
The CPU, or central processing unit, is comprised of interconnected components that make
it possible for programs to execute. For that reason, it is targeted by side channel attacks
to a considerable extent. In a computational environment, its bus connections with on-
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board resources like main memory and input/output (I/O) devices make it the main physical
resource. This is because any data from any of the involved resources must be brought to the
CPU for manipulation. Modern CPUs consists of multiple cores, which makes it possible to
improve performance efficiency and to run a number of programs concurrently. Each core
amounts to one logical isolated processor inside the CPU die. Each of which has its own
components as follow:
1. CPU Registers The fastest memory in a computing system is the CPU register. It is
also the smallest memory in the system. Registers are online memories and they are the
place where any program instructions are actually executed. Registers are measured by
the number of bits which they hold: eight; thirty-two and sixty-four.
Registers fall into a number of types, each of which has the responsibility of a particular
function. Some registers cannot be accessed by the programmers, only the OS. These
include the Memory Address Register (MAR), the Instruction Register (IR) and the
Memory Buffer Register (MBR), as well as the Temporary Register (TR). However,
some registers are available for use by the programmers by utilising either an assembly
language or another high level language such as C and C++. General Purpose Registers
(GPR hold both program instructions and data. Debugging registers hold program states
in real-time. Flag Registers (FR) hold information on the occurrences of particular
conditions in the operations of the CPU. Debug Registers, Model Specific Registers
(MSR) and Control Registers ensure the proper usage of the MSRs in capturing CPU
events accurately. They are all used to improve system performance and to locate
weaknesses in the programme. For security reasons, CPU manufactures, such as
Intel and AMD, do not provide detailed documentation for these registers. However,
researchers have found detailed information on the registers in order to propose their
vulnerabilities (Kocher et al., 2018; Lipp et al., 2018). The focus in this study will be
on MSR, which are charged with capturing events in which the CPU has an interest
which occur in relation to the CPU components: cache misses, branch predictions and
the total number of instructions executed. For more details on MSRs, see 3.2.3.2.
2. Caches are an on-chip buffer inside the CPU, and their purpose is to promote the
efficiency of data transformation. In typical computer systems, memories are ordered
by size (small to large) and by speed (high to slow). The registers include L1, L2, LLC
caches and the main memory. CPU caches the buffer data that has been required from
the main memory in a trade-off of performance against speed, so then the CPU has
the data when it needs it. The buffer arrangement is sequential, with a typical CPU
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comprising of a cache at three levels: L1, L2 and LLC, which maps the order from
fast to slow and small to large (the larger it is, the slower it is) with the exception that
L1 is split between instructions and data. Speed variations provide attacks, which
run concurrently with the attacker’s program, with their main source of information
about the data prefetch activities of other programs (i.e. victims) which can be used
for malicious purposes.
The caches are differently structured from level to level. The LLC cache is the outer
level and is connected to the RAM directly. The basis of communication is through
pages, with each page mapping the LLC cache sets and each cache set is divided
into smaller units called cache lines1 . Each cache line size varies from 4 to 64
bytes depending on the operating system settings. LLC provides the interface for L2
communication. The number of cache sets will generally be larger in LLC and larger
in L2 than in L1. This is a hierarchical system and the data is tracked from RAM to
L1. CPU caches are the essential intermediate between CPU computational units and
the main memory. Each memory access is called a transaction through CPU caches.
CPU caches are the resources that are targeted the most by attackers.
Cache memory is the most important determinant of performance in a computer system.
A number of algorithms have been proposed to exploit these characteristics by which
future data can be predicted. For programs with loops, algorithms exist to forecast
which data will be needed next by the loop that is to be brought to the closest cache
memory. Using these algorithms raises performance levels as the algorithm advises the
operating system what data is about to be required. Thus, the CPU decreases the ideal
state in which the CPU is waiting until the data is brought to the cache. However, side
channel attackers have exploited these features to achieve their malicious intentions.
Section 3.3 demonstrates how attackers can exploit these characteristics
3. Miss/Hit events are memory access occurrences that arise from hierarchical memory
when data is buffered. Their main purpose is latency measurement to identify program
bottlenecks. The CPU begins by asking for data from the lowest level (L1) and if the
data is not found there, then it moves higher level by level until it reaches the main
memory. Each request to move up one level is counted as a miss event at that level;
when no miss event occurs, a hit is registered. Misses and hits can be gathered directly
from the Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) or by encoding the differences in
time execution for the memory accesses, which is mostly used by side channel attacks.
1It is the smallest unit that can be dealt among cache levels to exchange data
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Note, however, that miss/hit events have a greater complexity than simply being
numbers. They can arise from a variety of sources. As an example, when the value of
a variable is accessed in the main memory for the first time, there will be a series of
misses as each level fails to provide the required value. There will be cases where the
value has been temporarily evicted from the memory level that it previously occupied.
This is dependent on the design of the hardware and on the programme, and attackers
use such evictions in the measurement of data-dependent accesses.
The reason behind the different ways of organising caches is to yield the highest hit
rate. This to avoid cache line contentions. However, such attacks take advantage of
the contentions in order to encode the victims activities from the usage of the shared
hardware or resources.
4. Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU): Programmers need help in debugging and
locating the bottlenecks in their programs and PMU provides this assistance with
run-time feedback. PMU offers services to programmers by detailing the current state
of the internal CPU and its connection with I/O devices in real-time. More details are
given in section 3.2.3.
5. Timing Timing program execution with a high resolution is a key side channel attack
measure. Different resources exist to align the timing with the platform and CPU
architecture. The timing can be used by taking the start time and end time of the
motherboard’s clock such as gettodaytime(), as in Linux systems. However, PMC,
which sets one of the registers to count the CPU cycles, provides more details as given
in the settings in Section 3.2.3.1. Time Stamp Counters (TSC) can also be used at a
low level to count the cycle spent during execution of a program or a piece of code
which is preferred by side channel studies due to its accuracy.
Time Stamp Counter (TSC) is a 64-bit register that has been installed on every x86
processor since the Pentium. TSC observations are widely used in performance and
side channel attack domains. It provides an automatic count of the number of cycles
from the time which it is started to the time which it is stopped. Executing the RDTSC
instruction accesses TSC, returning the TSC register contents to EDX:EAX. The main
use of RDTSC is modelling a data leakage attack, especially in the observation stages
such as Prime+Prob (Maurice et al., 2015b), Flush+Reload (Yarom and Falkner, 2014)
and Evict+Time (Tromer et al., 2010).
6. Out-of-Order and Serialisation is a program execution mechanism used in multi-
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core systems to execute instructions simultaneously that are subject to the availability
of data and execution unites in a fair manner to avoid CPU stalls. Out-of-order does
not guarantee the sequence in which the program instructions are executed. With an
Out-of-Order execution, it is hard to accurately measure the data access time for a
particular piece of code or instruction due to the interference of the counting cycles
of previous instructions. Instead, it may count the operations of the different codes.
Intel researchers Paoloni (2010) therefore proposed a solution to guarantee the precise
measurement of the data accesses of a piece of code by serialising the RDTSC using
CPUID with some operating system function support to pin down the TSM register
for assignment to the selected code and to guarantee that the cycles to that code are
counted. Furthermore, Yarom and Falkner (2014) proposed a different serialisation
approach using mfence and lfence to accurately observe the cache activities with
minimum costs.
3.2.2 Performance Measurement Tools
HPC are a set of registers in PMU used for performance measurements. The main use
of HPCs is to measure the performance of a piece of code, program or system (Eyerman
et al., 2006) and to find out the impact on the system’s bottlenecks. The HPCs utilisation
requires careful attention due to the complexity and permissions of its registers. There are
many profiling tools and libraries used to abstract the complexity and to easily produce
monitoring reports about the system and program activities in both user and kernel spaces.
The following sections lists the most two popular tools which are used side channel attacks
studies (Chiappetta et al., 2015; Nomani and Szefer, 2015).
1. PAPI In 1999, (13) introduced a portable library Performance Application Program-
ming Interface2 used to abstract the complexity of HPC utilisation (Dongarra et al.,
2001; Terpstra et al., 2010). PAPI is a widely-used research tool, especially in high
performance computing, to measure access time across the memory hierarchy and the
usage of CPU components (Eijkhout, 2015). PAPI can monitor preset events when
two or more events occur simultaneously, but large sets of events generate overheads.
Johnson et al. (2012) extended PAPI-V in 2012 to provide support for VM. However,
PAPI-V cannot support all events as the native does.
2is an opensource library, which is the specification of a cross-platform interface related to hardware perfor-
mance counters in modern microprocessors including Intel and AMD processors. http://icl.cs.utk.edu/papi/
3.2 Background 45
2. Perf Perf is a profiler tool made for Linux 2.6+ based systems that abstracts away
CPU hardware differences in Linux performance measurements and presents a simple
commandline interface. Perf is based on the perf events system call interface for most
of the involved tasks.
3.2.3 High Performance Counters (HPC)
This section reviews the HPCs built into modern Intel processors used for debugging and
performance measurements. High Performance Counters (HPC) are a set of registers in
Performance Monitoring Units (PMU). HPC gives the programmers runtime feedback to
help in debugging and to help find software bottlenecks in critical parts of various programs.
On the other hand, recent studies showed that the use of HPCs in the security domain have
become popular, particularly in relation to malware and side channel attack detection. HPC
consists of various sets of integrated registers used to set up very precise metrics for different
measurement scales, ranging from micro-operations, pieces of code and applications through
to the entire system. In a modern multi-core processor, each processor core has one HPC
charged with capturing Off-core activities. Furthermore, a set of PMUs on the same machine
are able of working together to monitor Uncore activities3.
This study examines the PMU components used for settings, configurations and profiling
for performance measurements. The main implementation of this thesis essentially relies
on the utilisation of PMU in the proposed detection system. Consequently, the utilised
components in this thesis have been detailed in the following sub-sections.
3.2.3.1 Events:
Event are the essential characteristics used to establish the metrics that are in turn used to
measure performance, which is described as the occurrence of a hardware action in response
to the usage of CPU components. Examples include the L1, L2 and LCC cache accesses and
branch predictions. Events can be per core (Offcore) or per socket (Uncore). The focus in
this thesis is only on Offcore events.
Supported events vary by manufacturer and processor model. Each CPU architecture
comes with its own list of events. As PMUs are processor specific, they thus support two
event types: one of which is architectural events which can be found in the CPUs which have
the same physical components. For instance, LLC cache misses can be found in any CPUs
that have an LLC cache memory, and the supported architectural events listed by CPU model
3For more details, visit https://software.intel.com/en-us/forum
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Code Description
309H counts the number of instructions which are executed
30AH the unhalted cycles of the processor core
30BH the number of reference cycles at the Time Stamp Counter (TSC) rate when the
core is not in a halt state
Table 3.1 Fixed function events
has been shown in Chapter 18 (Intel, 2014). Non-architectural events vary by processor
model. Modern CPUs typically support hundreds of non-architectural events, which have
been listed by CPU model in Chapter 19 Intel (2014).
3.2.3.2 Model Specific Registers
A Model Specific Registers (MSR) is a set of registers called Performance Monitor Counters
(PMC)s. A PMC can record the fine details of low-level activities during program execution.
The number of registers varies from one CPU model to another. There are two types of PMC
Fixed Function, which are three fixed registers in a typical CPU used to count specific events
as listed in Table 3.1 and General Purpose registers, which are model specific. They typically
consisted of four registers used to count various events. The list of all supported events for
each model has been listed in Chapter 18 (Intel, 2014). Unlike fixed function counters, they
must be set before use. Figure 3.1 shows the layout of the PMC registers holding the counted
value and the number of times that the specified event has occurred. Typical modern CPUs
have seven 64-bit performance counters including both fixed and general purpose registers,
only 48-bits of which are active, so the maximum value that the counter holds is 0xFFFFFF.
If the counter exceeds this number, then it causes overflow errors. PMC registers can be set
either to zero or to a selected value. In the performance tools, intervals are used to make the
observation within a loop. With every iteration, the counters are reset. On the other hand,
PMC registers set to a value to trigger overflow Vogl and Eckert (2012) are used to trap the
attacker from using a system call. In this thesis, both fixed and general purpose counters
have mainly been used in the data collection stage. In this chapter, all PMC registers have
been used in the experiments equally. In chapter 4, the only general purpose registers used
primarily contributed in the detection and identification phases.
3.2.3.3 Performance Event Select Registers
Performance Event Select Registers are a set of special registers that control and configure the
PMC registers. The only registers that have been utilised in this thesis are listed as follows:
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Fig. 3.1 Layout of IA32_PerfEvtSelit h MSRs
1. PerfEvtSeli: the register responsible for setting the programmable counter registers.
We can assume that a processor with four programmable counters PMCi registers is
used to count four supported events by the processor, when i ∈ {1,2,3,4}. To operate
the PMCi registers correctly in counting events, each PMCi register must be locally
enabled by the PerfEvtSeli register and globally enabled by the overall register. Figure
3.1 shows the layout of PerfEvtSeli register.
The first byte, which starts from bit 0-7, holds an event logic unit. The next byte,
starting from bit 8-15, holds a unit mask. Any candidate event must comprise of
a combination of these two. For instance, an event UOPS_RETIRED.ALL comprises
Umask:0x01 and event:0xC2 = 0x01C2
Bit 16 and 17 are used to determine whether the user space is excluded or included and
the OS respectively, including kernel space activities, in profiling tasks. This option is
contributed to in the profiling mechanism by removing the services which are working
in the background.
INT represents bit 20 in the register, enabling for an APIC interrupt to trigger an
interrupt in the PMC overflow due to 0xFFFFFF being exceeded. The purpose of EN
bit 22 is to enable or disable counting by the PMC register. However, in this study,
overflow does not happen because the window interval for each sample is very small.
2. IA32_FIXED_CTR_CTRL The configurations of the fixed-function PMCs are done
by writing to the bit fields in the MSR. The common operations in configuring PMC are
enabling or disabling the event counters before and after specified tasks, and checking
the status of the counter overflows, which is globally done by the following MSRs.
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3. IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL This MSR can enable/disable the event counting of
all or any combination of fixed-function PMCs and any general-purpose PMCs.
4. IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS This MSR allows for the querying of counter over-
flow conditions in any combination of fixed-function PMCs or general purpose PMCs.
5. IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL This MSR allows for the software to clear
counter overflow conditions in any combination of fixed-function PMCs or general-
purpose PMCs.
6. Performance Monitor Interrupts (PMI): A field in the control register that generates
an exception through LAPIC in an overflow condition for fixed function counters and
programmable counters PMCi. In Intel CPUs, IA32 PERF GLOBAL CTRL MSR
provides single-bit controls to enable the counting of each performance counter. PMI
fills in the various functions for a range of use-cases. It is used to detect faults when and
where counter registers are improperly set. It is also used for the periodic event-based
sampling of specified events on the PMCs. Finally, it has been used maliciously to
detect system calls in Malware attacks (Vogl and Eckert, 2012).
3.2.3.4 Hardware Performance Counters Setup
The performance of measurement tasks requires setting and configuring the Performance
Event Select Registers. Thus, this section illustrates the steps used to set up the PMC register
to automatically count the specified events. Programming counters set the event-based
interval and aspects of the profiling behaviour including the interval at which the samples
should be generated.
Setting up hardware performance by user program or existing tools and libraries requires
the rdmsr and wrmsr to read and write MSR registers, including PMCs required to count
specific events. These instructions both use the ECX register to transmit the parameters for
writing on the MSR registers or for getting the values of the PMC registers. The rdmsr
instruction can also be used in the user space to read the fixed function4 registers because
they do not require a write on the MSR registers to specify an event.
Read operation: rdmsr instructions load the 64-bit contents of the specified MSR
register into the EDX:EAX registers. The MSR registers the 32-bit high order as being
loaded into the EDX register and the 32-bits low order into the EAX register. The EDX:EAX
4This does not work if fixed registers have been used by another service, unless the services are denied from
accessing fixed registers such as MNI watchdog
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combination generates the counters’ actual number. This can be done in C using bit-wise
operations.
((long long)EDX) | (((long long)EAX) < < 32)
The writing operation: wrmsr cannot be executed in the user space and must be executed
in the kernel space. Executions of the wrmsr instructions must therefore be in privilege ring-0.
Therefore when PMC is used either by the user programs or by the tools, they must interface
with the kernel as a driver to execute the wrmsr instructions .It then stores the contents of
the EDX:EAX registers to a specified 64-bit MSR register. The contents of EDX go into the
high-order 32-bits and the contents of EAX go into the low-order 32 bits.
Using rdmsr and wrmsr is not guaranteed to read or write the desired processor core PMC
counters during profiling, especially if an interrupt is triggered. The use of Linux built-in
interfaces is therefore recommended, and these are provided in /x86/include/asm/msr.h
to set up an inter-processor interrupt. This will ensure that the MSR register read/write
operations take place in the desired processor core. The interfaces are:
int rdmsr_safe_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 msr_no, u32 *l, u32 *h)
static inline int rdmsr_safe_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 msr_no, u32 *l, u32 *h)
Each of these functions takes on a single extra parameter - unsigned int cpu - which is
the ID of the processor core used to guarantee that the profiling task will be pinned to the
targeted processor core.
3.3 Threat Model
In this section, a brief microprocessor architecture design has been presented in relation
to the side channel attack technique named Flush+Reload. The Malicious Loop (ML) is
highlighted in a way that the detection system relies on.
In typical computer systems, there are four main memory layers to accommodate data
when it is in a used state (DIU). They are hierarchically categorised from small in size to
high in speed such as the L1 cache to large and slower, which is the main memory. Three
layers (L1, L2 and L3 or LLC) are CPU caches used to buffer data in the main memory for a
very short time. The data accesses are different at each layer; this is the key factor of side
channel attack techniques based on access time or where they rely on data dependency. When
CPU needs to access a piece of data in the main memory, it must be buffered in LLC, L2
and L1. In multi-tasking systems, an OS dedicates a region of memory for a program that is
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logically isolated from the other regions of other programs in a manner so then the processes
of one program cannot access the regions of other programs. This isolation is secured by
the OS. However, in some OS settings, the OS shares a region of memory across multiple
programs (i.e. shared library in Linux and DLL in MS Windows) to optimise performance
and to reclaim more memory. Here, side channel attacks come into play by exploiting the
resources and shared features.
In this model, a Flush+Reload attack technique is utilised to find the memory contentions
while attacker and victim are using shared library. The AES algorithm is used to encrypt the
plain text for both the attacker and victim. In Figure 3.2, the yellow page is the shared library
in which the AES components are stored. The main components that are compromised by the
attacker includes the look-up table (T ), which is an array of secret elements which replaces
the run-time computation with a simpler array indexing operation to generate a cipher text.
Inside the victim, the shared library is utilised to encrypt the plain text. In the attacker’s
program, there is a ML used to scan T from the beginning address of T0 to the end address of
Tn to find out which element has recently been accessed by the victim, which is called data
dependency. ML has two main tasks, one of which is to flush an address within the range of
the addresses that the Ti is stored. We assume that this is used by the victim processes, and
that this is followed by accessing the flushed address. This is the key feature in the proposed
framework concerning the detection and identification tasks. In step one, the attacker flushes
an address in T and waits for a very short time to observe the victim’s access to the flushed
address. When the victim accesses the flushed address, the data in the flushed address is
brought to the LLC. In step three, the attacker accesses the flushed address and compares the
access time. If the access time is approximated to the threshold, which is the cache access
time excluded from the main memory access time, then this indicates that the flushed address
has recently been accessed by the victim. This way, the attacker encodes the observations
stored in an array, and then statistical analysis is applied on the off-line data to deduce the
secret key.
3.4 Methodologies
This chapter presents three common supervised algorithms to classify Flush+Reload and
Prime+Probe side channel attacks against AES, and then to compare the results of each
method to determine which one most efficiently detected the attack under different workloads
and the negative impact on accuracy.
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Fig. 3.2 A typical Flush+Reload attack against AES
3.4.0.1 Classification and regression or prediction
Most machine learning algorithms can complete classification and regression tasks. Classifi-
cation allows for the prediction of exact classes from a given data-set. For example, each
instance in the data-set must be either malicious or benign. Regression, on the other hand,
predicts continuous values and not classes - it might predict prices, distances or weights
items in a class that would be likely to be fetched, given the features that each possesses.
3.4.0.2 Bias and Variance
are key components in the accurate measurement of classification and regression tasks.
Researchers use bias and variance to optimise the classifier (classification) or predictor
(regression) models. Adjusting the degree of each bias or variance will affect the prediction.
Building an optimal model requires a trade-off between bias and variance that will be arrived
at based on the nature of the data (Breiman, 1996b).
1. Variance or over-fitting: An algorithm with very high variance pays excessive atten-
tion to the training data and fails to generalise a new model for the unseen data. It is
basically memorising the training data instead of generalising. When it receives a new
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data-set that does not closely resemble the training data-sets, it has no way of dealing
with the unseen data.
2. Bias or under-fitting: High bias means that the training data contains errors; an
algorithm with a very high bias pays little attention to the training data, and whatever
actions the training data might be encouraging. The errors can be analysed in different
ways, including low r2 and a large sum of squared error (SSE), among others.
3.4.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
PCA is an unsupervised machine learning algorithm widely used in dimensional reduction
to facilitate classification. It is a simple and widely-used algorithm which can be used to
fin the direction of the spread of the data with the greatest variance before generating new
coordinates.
3.4.2 Neural Network (NN)
NN is a supervised machine learning algorithm. It can be used to build a predictive model
by learning from historical data and using the patterns to throughput binary or multiclass
classifications.
The ability of NN to self-learn from examples allows the researchers to train NN with
features from CPU events from which it acquires the knowledge to classify CPU activities
into malicious and non-malicious respectively. Neural network architecture can generally
be categorised into single-layer feed-forward networks, multi-layer feed-forward networks
and recurrent networks. A number of other types have emerged including perceptron,
backpropagation, self-organising map, adaptive resonance theory and radial basis function.
Ngiam et al. (2011) showed the efficiency of the algorithm in dealing with low dimen-
sional data sets. This can work more efficiently with PCA, which reduces the dimension of
the data. To accelerate the learning process, we used PCA to reduce the dimension and to
then pass it on to the optimisation algorithm, L-DFGS, which is efficient for small data sets.
In choosing between the three activation functions, we have considered speed and ac-
curacy. Because attacks are fast, data can be retrieved in less than one minute. Recently,
Kingma and Ba (2014) introduced Adaptive Moment Estimation (ADAM), an optimisation
technique used in NN which is fast, computationally efficient and requires less memory than
DFGS. It also deals efficiently with large data sets. The Quasi-Newton method, on the other
hand, is computationally expensive and requires more memory to store the Hessian matrix,
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while LDFGS accelerates the speed of deep network learning (Dean et al., 2012). They
used the algorithm for large data sets and showed it to be faster than the SGD algorithm.
Limited-memory DFGS do not store Hk and are therefore faster than DFGS. Faced with a
large data set, as we mentioned, ADAM is faster. Therefore, ADAM was used as the activate
function.
3.4.3 K Nearest Neighbour (k-NN)
The instance-based algorithm k-NN is a simple non-parametric classification algorithm that
is long-standing (Cover and Hart, 1967). It may be used in any classification task using
discrete data but the classification of unseen data-sets and regression tasks to predict a
continuous label relies on data-sets based on a time series. Each tested data class is predicted
by measuring the test data items’ similarity. The classification process was conducted on the
test data-set realised for each class and its k closest neighbours. Any set of sample data points
can be classified according to its neighbours’ majority vote. k-NN makes use of a search
engine based on the measurement distance functions to find the closest data items to the
data-set. k-NN has been studied for a considerable period of time and a number of distance
measures have been used, with the most popular being Euclidean, Hamming, Manhattan and
Minkowski. This study has made use of the Hamming measure to find the best k instance for





| f − y| (3.1)
Optimal k values are found on the basis that larger values mean a better classification.
Since this approach is not reliable, this study uses the cross-validation (CV) Arlot et al.
(2010); Kohavi et al. (1995) to determine how optimised the k value is. Cross-validation
divides the data-sets into a number of predefined data-sets before feeding them independently
to k-NN during training and testing tasks. The optimal k value is selected by the search
engine from a number of independent predefined data-sets.
The k-NN algorithm measures the distances between the data items in the data-set. This
is why k-NN has been chosen; the choice of data set rests on the data sample similarities
with stress on the features that are near to their neighbours. The features chosen for this
experiment include L1, L2 and LLC cache misses. This is because Flush+Reload attacks
work by flushing a specific memory address from all levels of cache (L1, L2 and LLC) and,
after a very short sleep, accessing the memory address that was flushed. Three consecutive
cache accesses are needed; the memory access instruction generates an identical number of
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hardware events, which in this case consists of cache misses, for each cache level. k-NN is
looking for data items with the least distance between them, and so identifies efficiently the
ML inside the Flush+Reload program.
3.4.4 Tree Algorithms
Tree algorithms work in a divide and conquer fashion by partitioning a given data-set
recursively using either a depth-first Hunt et al. (1966) or breadth-first Shafer et al. (1996)
approach until all of the data elements belong to a specific class. Tree algorithms attempt
to detect the factors which affect the change occurring due to a specific event. It builds a
tree structure-like model to efficiently predict unseen data (test data). Tree algorithms build
classifiers in two phases. First, is building a tree for classification purposes. Second, is
pruning the tree to generalise unseen data. The tree structure is composed of root, internal
and leaf nodes. Root node represents the best feature of the data-set used to partition the
data-set and the leaf nodes are the class labels. The internal nodes are generated by utilising
impurity measures. The tree model is then transformed into a set of if-else-then decision
rules and unseen samples are traversed from the root to leaf nodes to indicate one of the
given class labels.
Impurity is the core function in tree algorithms and heavily affects the tree’s performance.
Impurity measures split the nodes of all available features and then selects the features which
results in the most homogeneous sub-nodes. Impurity indicates the degree of homogeneity
of the new sub-nodes to find out which sub-node is more homogeneous by checking all
available features. The most common splitting criterion employed in impurity functions are
as follows.
1. Entropy (EN) relies on information theory to measure which subsets require more
information to indicate the degree of impurity in the same manner as if all elements
in a subset are homogeneous. If the entropy is zero, then this leads to gain high
accuracy. Whereas if the elements are equally distributed in a subset, then subset
has an entropy of one and consequently, the model fails to efficiently classify the
data. After calculating the entropy of each of the generated subsets, the sum will be
compared with the entropy of the parent.
Let’s assume that D is a data-set which contains samples from c classes. The impurity
functions for EN and GI are defined as follow:





− pi ∗ log2(pi) (3.2)
where Pi is the proportion of class i in D.
2. Gini Index (GI) tries to minimise mis-classification by measuring the total variance
across the classes. Where the Gini function returns zero, this is when the best sep-
aration can be achieved or return one when the distribution of the classes is 50/50.






Gain(T,F) = IM(T )− IM(T,F) (3.4)
When Impurity function IM = EN = GI, 0 ⩽ IM ⩽ 1, T = target variable and F =
Feature to be split on IM(T,F) = the impurity is calculated after the data is split on
feature F





C4.5 is one of the supervised machine learning algorithms. It is uniquely easy to read and
understand. The goal is to build a model that predicts the value of a target variable by asking
multiple linear questions one by one to create a boundary. Future data is classified using a
very simple data structure called a Tree. It is a statistical classifier like other classifiers, and
uses a set of data to train and build a decision tree model using the concept of information
entropy. The trained data is split into n-dimensional vectors which represent the features of
the sample data and its class.
3.5 Model Evaluation Metrics
This section introduces the existing techniques which are used to evaluate predictive models,
especially the classifiers generated from the supervised machine learning algorithms.
In supervised machine learning studies, there are various algorithms employed to solve
prediction problems including classification and regression. For each, there are different
metrics that have been utilised to measure a model’s performance in predicting the classes.
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When the machine learning algorithms are used for classification problems, a classifier
model will be built to predict unseen data for the potential classes. For instance, in binary
classification there are two classes of interest that the classifier should recognises them, in
our case they are normal and attack classes. Then the model builds a set of rules for both
classes, then unseen samples traverse through the model to output the result based on the
defined matching the pattern. After the model classified unseen data, the model needs to be
assessed its performance to test how well the model classifies unseen samples. Therefore, a
number of metrics have been defined for assessing the classifiers’ performance. Training sets
are fed to the algorithms to build the classifiers. However, 100% correct prediction of unseen
data cannot be guaranteed; there might be failure to predict some samples in the testing stage,
especially in noisy data-sets. Thus, there are various techniques to address the prediction
errors and based on that, further courses should be taken in the training stage such as data
pre-processing to improve the model’s performance and robustness.
In this thesis we have used three different methods to assess the machine learning
algorithms’ success in predicting the existence of a side channel attack. It then measured
the overall accuracy to show the best candidate for the detection tasks. The next sections
will discuss the most common metrics, which were used by the researcher in the context
of the classification problems to visualise model performance and to indicate how far the
predictions are from the actual values. Therefore, in the following subsections, more details
about the evaluation measurements and their components will be given.
3.5.1 Confusion Matrix
The confusion matrix contains information about the predicted classes produced by the
classifier models and the actual classes from the original data-sets. The confusion matrix
fairly provides the finer details of the classifiers in predicting unseen data. The confusion
matrix can be utilised for binary and multiple class classifications. A confusion matrix used
in relation to a binary class classification is a (2x2) matrix, whereas for multiple classes, there
is a (cxc) matrix when c is the number of classes. Through the confusion matrix, most of
the performance measurement metrics can be derived from the confusion matrix for various
purposes. Table 3.2 represents the actual classes (presented in columns) against the predicted
classes (presented in rows) in a (2x2) matrix. The first row in the matrix shows the number
of positive classes that the classifier predicted and the second row represents the negative
classes. Before giving any details on the measurement metrics, there are terminologies in the
confusion matrix which are described as follows:
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Prediction
Positive (P) Negative (N)
Normal (P) TP FP
Attack (N) TN FN
Total Positive Total Negative
Table 3.2 Confusion Matrix
1. True Positive (TP) is the case where the classifier correctly recognises the positive
samples in the data-set. For instance, if there are n positive samples in the actual class
and if T P = n, then this means that the classifier 100% detected the positive classes.
2. False Positive (FP) in this case, represents when the classifier miss-classifies the
positive classes as negative. FP =total number of actual positive classes −T P.
3. True Negative (TN) represents the total number of the negative classes detected by
the classifier correctly.
4. False Negative (FN) when the classifier miss-classifies n samples of the Negative
classes as Positive classes.
The ideal case for a classifier is when FP= 0 and FN = 0, which means that all potential
classes are predicted correctly. T P = total number of positive samples in the actual class and
T N = total number of negative samples of the actual classes, which means that all of the
positive and negative classes are predicted as actual classes. However, in real world problems,
it is not guaranteed that a predictor of 100% classifies the class of the target as the actual
class where unseen samples are fed to the models. This leads to generating FP and FN in
the model outcome. Therefore, most of the efforts are focused on minimising FP and FN.
Minimising FP or FN relies on the business needs and the context of the problem that is
going to be solved. In some cases, it is advised to minimise FN rather than FP, because FN
is more important than FP or vice versa.
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3.5.2 Evaluation Metrics
After building a prediction model, we need to make sure that the model is efficiently applied
in the unseen data-set. Therefore, there are a number of metrics that can be used to assess the
model. Different evaluation metrics are employed for different machine learning algorithms.
For instance, for unsupervised machine learning algorithms, there are a set of metrics and for
supervised algorithms, there are a different set of metrics. In this study, only classification
algorithms have been used, thus the focus will be on the metrics that are commonly used
in supervised machine learning for binary classification problems. As binary classification
is used to classify between normal and attack activities in the system, we will describe the
metrics that have been utilised in this thesis.
To explain the following metrics, let us assume that algorithm 1 captures 100 samples of
real-time program execution activities; 5 samples are actually attack activities (Positive) and
the rest are normal activities (Negative).
1. Recall/Sensitivity (True positive Rate (TPR)) corresponds to the proportion of nor-
mal activities that are positive samples.
Recall reveals what proportion of program activities actually were attacks, and what
were classified by the algorithm as attack activities. The actual positive samples are
the normal activities equal to the sum of T P and FN. The activities classified by the
model that are normal are T P; refer to Table 3.2. Recall is more about capturing all of
the samples that are attacks with the answer as attack. In equation 3.6, if the model
recognises the actual 5 attack activities correctly, then the recall of the model is 100%.




2. Precision (True Positive Value) measures what proportion of the program execution
activities which are classified as attack activities are actually attack activities. The
predictive attack activities (positive) are the sum of T P and FP and the actual attack
activities are T P, as expressed in equation 6.




3. Specificity (False Positive Rate (FPR)) corresponds to the attack activity samples
which are incorrectly classified as positive. Specificity exposes the finer details about
what proportion of the program’s execution activities are normal and what were
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classified as normal program execution activities otherwise. The actual negative
samples are equal to the sum of the FN and T N from the predictive model and the
program execution activities as classified as being normal (T N).




4. False Positive Value reveals how many negative samples are correctly detected by the
classifier; if the FPV is high, then it should be close to 100.
This tells us how many of the test negatives are true negatives and if this number is
high (should be close to 100), then it suggests that this new test is doing as good as the
gold standard.




5. Accuracy is a metric used to indicate how the model is at predicting the samples
correctly in the data-set. This also refers to the total number of correct prediction out
of the total number of samples in the training data-sets. The ideal values is one Total
Total Numbero f (T P and T N)
Total Numbero f samples
. Accuracy is recommended for balanced data-sets.
The accuracy results are shown in the experiment results in this chapter.
Accuracy =
T P + T N
T P +T N + FN +FN
(3.10)
3.5.3 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
The ROC curve as proposed by Bradley (1997) is a graphical tool used for visualising
predictive model performance metrics. It draws line graphs between recall or sensitivity and
specificity. Points on the curve are the ratio between 0 and 1. The diagonal line from (0,0) to
(1,1) indicates a random guess, which has 50% accuracy. Anything below this line is even
less likely to be correct than a random guess, while anything above the line will range from
good accuracy to excellent accuracy. The closer the line is to the top right corner, the better
the performance.
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3.5.4 Cross-Validation
The model needed the ability to generalise future data-sets. The data-set must therefore
represent the problem that is to be solved. The data-set was divided into training and testing
data-sets. First, the algorithms were trained on the training data-sets, after which they were
evaluated against the test-set. The trained classifier models did not work on the test-set,
so predictions on the testing set showed the general accuracy of the classifier. To ensure
that the selected data-sets represented the problem requiring a solution, a technique called
Cross-Validation (CV) was used. CV shuffled the data-set, including its attributes and
labelled classes. It then separated the entire data-set into a large number of equal sized
groups of instances, which are called folds. Each fold was treated as a new data-set, and
each was divided by the user into the recommended percentages of training and testing sets;
80% training and 20% test is one possible division. The data-sets were then fed into the
algorithms and their performance was monitored to evaluate their efficiency and accuracy.
Cross-validation transforms the whole data-set into training and testing sets as an alternative
to using separate testing and training sets. All of the data-set is involved in the transformation.
3.6 Synchronous Trace-based Detection
This section demonstrates the side channel attack detection using synchronisation approach.
3.6.1 Hardware and Software Specifications
The experiment was conducted on HP Proliant DL360 G7 with Intels Xeon X5650 2.66GHz
processor with 16 GB RAM running Ubuntu 14.04. The various tests used SPEC CPU2006.
3.6.2 Experiment
We have conducted an experiment study by using the data collected from the experiment itself.
We created an agent process that encrypted the fake data with the intention of simulating a
victim, and used the custom Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) to access the PMC registers
with minimum overhead in order to gain high resolution data. Our data set consisted of f
features, when F = {F1,F2,F3, ...,Ff } and f = 7, because only seven PMC counters were
available on the CPU, which is used in the experiment, including three fixed events (core
cycles, reference cycles and core instructions) and four more efficient programmable events.
For this experiment, we selected the most efficient events that had a positive impact on the
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classification of the selected methods by considering their relationship to the attacks. In this
experiment, we collected n samples, when a set of samples S = {S1,S2,S3, ...Sn}, so then
n= 100 and 50% of the samples are recorded while the victim is encrypting fake data and the
other 50% of the samples are the samples when the victim is synchronised with the attacker
while both are encrypting data and accessing the same shared library. Each sample row was
arranged so then Si = {X1(1,v), ...,Xi( f ,v),yi}, when 1 ⩽ i ⩽ n and v is the number of
encryption iterations executed by the victim. In this experiment, we used 3000 iterations
for each event so v = 3000. Thus, Xi represents e executions of AES encryption function
with the set of feature F . Each row samples Si is labelled by yi, which is the binary class that
represents either an attack or normal situation. In this experiment, half of S are labelled as
normal and the other half as attack activities.
The data was collected under two scenarios; one for light and one for heavy workloads.
In the first scenario, high resolution data was secured by running only victim and attack
programs. In the second scenario, we added noise by running additional applications from
SPEC SPEC20065; two int applications (bzip2 and gcc) and two floating applications
(bwaves and dealII)
The data-set was split into training and testing sets. The training sets contained 80
samples and 20 testing sets. To determine the influence of the different data set splits under
each method, we split the data sets randomly into 20-fold cross validations. The training set
is given to the machine learning algorithms to build the classifiers and the testing set is given
to the classifier to evaluate their performance.
In this study, we have shown the impact of MLs running inside the FR and PP attack
programs on the victim processes, which use a cryptographic algorithm to encrypt the
sensitive data. Our hope was to detect the attack in both light and heavy workloads. The
attacker would try to interfere with the victim processes and to synchronise itself with the
shared LLC by monitoring its cache memory activities and using statistics to deduce the
cache lines most recently used by the victim. We also hoped to detect the attack in the
shortest possible time of less than 5 seconds; an efficient attack Irazoqui et al. (2014) requires
over 50 seconds to recover all of the key fragments. This experiment can be applied in cloud
systems, except for the additional overhead which is produced by an additional translation
layer. This definitely reduces the resolution rate detection, as the most recent detection work
Gulmezoglu et al. (2017)Briongos et al. (2016)Zhang et al. (2016a) shows the difference in
accuracy rates between the native and cloud systems.
The shared library co-allocates two unrelated processes on LLC to the same machine.
5SPEC SPEC2006 is widely used to evaluate performance of computer systems https://www.spec.org/
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Table 3.3 Classification Accuracy for the three methods C4.5, PCANN and k-NN, against
two attacks Flush+Reload (FR) and Prime+Probe (PP).
Classification Accuracy on FR and PP
Type Bench\Attack
C4.5 NN k-NN
FR PP FR PP FR PP
∼SPEC No SPEC 0.97 0.98 0.93 0.76 0.85 0.83
SPECint
bzip2 0.91 0.96 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.78
gcc 0.87 0.94 0.77 0.79 0.84 0.8
SPECfp
bwaves 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74
dealII 0.75 0.7 0.7 0.64 0.63 0.7
Thus, we are able ot detect malicious FR and PP attack activities when a ML is run to
synchronise with the victim’s processes in order to give the attacker a chance of accessing
the shared memory. The aim of our hypothesis was to evaluate the best classification method
and the impact of SPEC in detecting such attacks with a high rate of accuracy even with the
loading of the benchmark.
3.6.3 Result Analysis and Discussion
We are looking for an optimal classifier that works accurately and efficiently among the
selected methods under both light and heavy workloads. Each of the three algorithms
presented in the previous section was run on each of the 20-fold splits of the data set divided
into training and testing sets respectively. Based on the previous studies and the results
gained from our experiment, we compared the methods based on accuracy and efficiency
because these two factors are important to the victims when dealing with sensitive data. For
accuracy, the victim needs to correctly classify the attack. For efficiency, the victim needs
to detect the attacks quickly before the attacker retrieves the whole key-bits and disrupt the
attack.
The results, as presented in Table (1) and Figure (1), show the accuracy of the side
channel attack classification including the FR and PP techniques for all methods in three
scenarios without SPEC (∼ SPEC), CPECint or SPECfp. The C4.5 algorithm performed
with the highest accuracy in all scenarios in reference to detecting FR. Without SPEC, the
success rate is 0.97%. This causes a fall in SPECint to 0.91% and to 0.87% in bzip2 and
gcc respectively. There is a further decrease from 0.74% in SPECfp and to 0.74% and 0.75%
for bwaves and dealII respectively. However, in PP detecting, it classifies better in SPEC,
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(a) C4.5 Algorithm against FR
(b) C4.5 Algorithm against PP
bzip2 and gcc. It stays the same in the bwaves, but it is worse in dealII. This is because,
in a PP attack, the attacker uses more CPU components and this maximises the number of
occurrences of specified events.
PCANN is good at detecting FR without SPECint and SPECfp, but it performs poorly in
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(a) PCANN Algorithm against FR
(b) PCANN Algorithm against PP
detecting PP attacks even without benchmarks. k-NN has a similar accuracy rate for FR and
PP attacks, but this drops down in a PP attack. The results from C4.5 are therefore seen to
be more reliable and robust than from PCANN and k-NN. This is because the C4.5 method
deals with noisy data better than the rest of the methods due to fast data exploration, finding
the relationships between the most significant variables. Turning to efficiency, the Decision
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(a) k-NN Algorithm against FR
(b) k-NN Algorithm against PP
Tree is more inefficient than PCANN and k-NN, but it still detects the attack with reasonable
efficiency.
However, running bzip2 and gcc applications in order to load the SPEC benchmark
showed that C4.5 has a higher level of accuracy than either NN or k-NN. k-NN’s efficiency
was slightly lower than C4.5, but NN had the worst accuracy overall. When bwaves was
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Fig. 3.6 Comparison of time execution for training in selected classifiers
loaded, they all had poor accuracy. This is because bwaves is in the float application
group and floating operations make heavier use of CPU components than integer operations,
resulting in a high number of cache misses and degrading the training of the classification
models.
The results shown in Figure 3.6 indicate that the size of the data set will be enough for
the detection agent to be able to learn of any malicious activities in a very short time. The
worst case is less than 1 second and this compares well with recent and fast FR attacks by
3.6, which needed over 50 seconds to retrieve the entire key. The agent can thus detect the
attack early enough to prevent the attacker from stealing the whole key, allowing them to
perform the actions necessary to stop the attacker.
It follows that the detection of FR and PP attacks will be difficult in noisy environments,
and especially so when intensive floating-point applications are running. This is because
floating point applications make use of CPU caches and generate a large number of cache
misses. Detection relies partly on CPU cache misses to detect FR and PP attacks.
These methods can be used by a host OS, in both native and cloud systems (though it
must be noted that cloud systems are less accurate than native systems), in order to distribute
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a fake process running cryptographic algorithms such as AES to identify malicious activities
and to prevent them from stealing the entirety of a secret key.
The results show that system activities in the background do not significantly impact the
results, with all methods performing well. Intensive workloads introduce more noise into the
system, which has a negative impact on accuracy. In particular, the SPECfp benchmark made
the result worse than the SPECint benchmarks. This is because the floating operations cause
a high occurrence of CPU events. Loading the SPEC benchmarks places stress on the CPU
components, particularly on the caches. A SPECfp benchmark interferes with the monitoring
processes and introduces noise into the environment.
Chapter 4
Designing and Implementing the
Framework (TrapMP)
This chapter introduces a new framework for securing the computational environment from
Side Channel Attacks in host Operating Systems (OS). The framework utilises hardware
features, namely High-Performance Counters (HPC), which are mainly used to optimise
the performance of programs or systems, in both native and cloud systems. The key to
this framework is that processor core level observation is deployed to detect abnormal
memory contention (or transaction) activities, which are unintentionally performed by the
attackers, during real-time program execution. Currently, existing solutions designed to
detect side channel attacks perform analyses by relying on the synchronisation of workloads
between attack and victim activities. Our approach yields a high-rate detection accuracy with
significant performance improvements as demonstrated by the SPEC benchmark in the KVM
environment.
The attacker then uses the CPU performance counters to measure differences in memory
access, before interpreting the meaning of cache uses by the target’s program when both
attacker and target are using the same program. In the side channel attack, the attack program
runs malicious loops that continuously scan the system’s memory to deduce what part of
the shared memory the victim is accessing and then builds a statistical model to deduce and
retrieve bits from the secret key used by the victim’s program. Using HPCs makes it possible
to extract features from the attack program’s activities, and it is, therefore, essential to
establish how such features can be extracted in real-time from program execution attributes.
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4.1 Motivation
Anti-virus software and other anti-malware tools struggle to detect side channel attacks,
because side channel attacks do not achieve their ends by escalating system privileges. Side
channel attackers make use of the current state of the CPU of interest, more specifically
memory contentions, known as cache misses. HPCs are the core of CPU components,
indicating the current state of a CPU. However, HPC utilisation most often requires kernel
or OS privileges either for attack or for defence, but side channel attacks involve abusing
CPU cache memories (L1, L2 and LLC) to detect sensitive memory transactions and then
access them without OS involvements. As a result, side channel attack programs produce
unintentional memory contentions during their execution. Thus, these memory contentions
can be monitored with HPC support with minimum requirements, without, for example,
system settings and configurations, dedicated hardware resources (Zhang et al., 2016a) or
injecting the sensitive applications (Kulah et al., 2018), such as cryptographic applications
which are targeted by attackers. Instead, the detection system can be implemented as a
service and deployed into the host OS with very low performance overheads.
4.2 Components of Computational Environment
This section describes the necessary components for building the security framework
(TrapMP) to detect malicious processes in both native and cloud systems. This section
helps to understand how an attack is achieved, what causes the vulnerabilities and in what
settings, and from what configurations the attack benefits; it also considers how the program
phase is utilised and how it can be used in data collection.
4.2.1 Multi-core Platforms
Mainstream microprocessors support a large number of inter-connected cores with complex
memory systems within the CPU dies. Each processor core has private caches L1 and L2
and one inclusive Last Level Cache (LLC) across the processor cores. Any communications
between processor cores and other sources in the machine must pass through processor cache
memories. Thus, high frequency hardware contentions occur in all cache levels, particularly
in LLC, because it represents the highest level of cache memory and is inclusive for L1 and
L2. The main source which supplies the CPU with data and instructions is the main memory.
Memory access works hierarchically in the sense that each lower level of memory buffers
data from one level higher above it. The speed of cache memories varies from level to level.
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This make the data leakage feasible at each level. Microprocessor industries have provided
flexibility in using CPUs by modifying the hardware settings in multi-core platforms. For
instance, an OS can run under process or thread mode. In process mode, two processes
cannot share private caches, whereas in thread mode, threads can share private L1 and L2
caches.
4.2.2 Multi-tasking (Model) Systems
Multi-tasking systems have brought together CPU designers and the programming com-
munity in terms of their agreement on significantly exploiting the computing power of
multi-core processors to save considerable energy with optimal performance. This has
motivated researchers to focus more effort on proposing various algorithms and resource
adaption (preservation) mechanisms to host the maximum possible number of programs
across processor cores with a minimal degradation of system performance. These efforts
have led to a heterogeneous computational environment which means that various sort of
applications can be accommodated by shared resources such as cache memories. Thus, task
scheduling becomes more complex to handle memory transactions.
In real time systems, a program is composed of one or more tasks or processes (for the
rest of the thesis we use the term process instead of task), each of which is divided into
a number of sub-tasks which are called jobs. Each job consists of a chunk or number of
consequent instructions which are queued and managed by the OS scheduler so that they are
ready for real-time execution, as each has a time quantum which varies depending on the
scheduler algorithms. The scheduler put the jobs in the queue in a fair manner. Each job has
an execution time quantum and is bounded by its life-cycle in the environment. The job has
to be assigned to one of the processor cores by the OS scheduler. It is not guaranteed that the
scheduler will always assign jobs for the same process to the same processor core. Instead,
it shuffles them across online (active) processor cores to avoid stalls and this is subject to
availability. When a job has been assigned to a processor core, the job has exclusive access
to the available resources until the job is complete except in the case that an interrupt is
triggered and it has to be suspended. Thus, interrupts have been utilised in the Section
Identification Phase 4.13 which traps the attacker processes and changes their execution path
into a check point in order to take the necessary action to identify the attackers.
Two or more jobs of the same task can run concurrently across processor cores, but they
can never be overlapped or pre-empted (concurrent) in the same processor core. Assigning
jobs is on a queue basis. Tasks are given equal time slices called quanta. The jobs of a task
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are divided in the time scale in a sequential manner. One job has to be finished, then the
next job is assigned to the available cores. When a job is assigned to a core, all the core
components are utilised for the job such as HPC, L1 and L2 caches. But the LLC cache is
available for all online processor cores, maintaining data until the upcoming jobs evict the
previous content. Thus, cross core attacks are viable because it does not matter what accesses
the content of the LLC, particularly when two processes are synchronised (i.e. in the case of
side channel attacks; go to section 3.3 for more details). This is a limitation of the OS which
cannot control memory access at that level, particularly when the resources are shared. As
a result, it is crucial to propose a mechanism which supports attack mitigation and is not
influenced by any factors such as attackers evading detection systems or hiding themselves
from monitoring mechanisms such as Hexpads (Payer, 2016).
Hardware threads are virtual cores which maximise the efficient utilisation of hardware
resources. Hyper-threading is a technique which helps to manage the utilisation of shared
resources efficiently between threads to achieve optimal performance. This is because,
hyperthreading minimises computational latency, particularly in the presence of stalls. When
one thread is stalled another thread can be scheduled and uses the resources. The difference
between processes and threads is that the cost of loading processes is higher than threads
in term of the data structure; more information is held in loading processes than threads.
This require more resources and time to be allocated, initialised and loaded. Besides, in
hyper-threading, threads need a higher number of inter-communications between them and
each interruption requires a context switch. Therefore, high interrupts incur performance
overheads to the system due to using system calls and transferring data from memory to
registers. Moreover, hyper-threading opens up security gaps in terms of leaking data Zhang
et al. (2012) from private cache memory allowing sensitive data to be stolen. This is due to
the fact that in multi-threading, the private L1 and L2 cache may be shared. Consequently,
the multi-threading feature is disabled by default in many cloud systems such as Amazon
AWS, because in this case, processes cannot share private L1 and L2 caches and this prevents
side channel attacks from stealing data at this level.
Both processes and threads are independent sequences of execution. The typical differ-
ence is that threads (of the same process) run in a shared memory space in which L1 and
L2 caches can be exploited for data leakage attacks, while for processes running in separate
memory spaces, each process has exclusive access to the resources of L1 and L2. LLC and
main memory, however, are shared and will be exploited by attackers.
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4.2.3 Real-time Scheduling
Scheduling is one of the core OS services to support and mange hardware resources across
running programs. The main goal of the scheduler is to minimise power consumption (Zhang
and Chang, 2014), which is used by the resources, and offer the optimal performance by
minimising stalls (Sherwood et al., 2003a) to provide the optimal dynamic adoption, dynamic
voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS)1 (Valentini et al., 2013). Thus, OS designers and
researchers introduce optimal scheduling algorithms to aid bottlenecks and reduce power
consumption in order to utilise the highest possible speed that a CPU has taking account
of hardware limitations. The main focus in scheduling studies is the efficient usage of
underlying hardware resources and how to virtualise and share them across processes. On the
other hand, side channel attacks come into account to distort smooth scheduling by misusing
the shared resources due to scheduler vulnerabilities while using them (Kocher et al., 2018;
Lipp et al., 2018); this results in an obstacle in front of scheduler to scale up CPU components
as CPU speed.
In this work, we take advantage of understanding how the scheduler slices the core-based
program execution timeline across multiple tasks, and assigns tasks across online cores in
the system. So, it is crucial to categorise the scheduler in real-time systems. There are two
main types of time slicing that the schedulers rely on in real time systems to manage shared
resources: hard and soft real time. For hard real time, each periodic task has a deadline
for completing its task which means it is restricted to finishing its computations according
to timing constraints, and such schedulers are built into embedded systems. In contrast,
in soft real time there is a deadline for each task, but it is not compulsory to finish the
task within the deadline. Instead, it depends on the nature of the program requirement in
terms of utilising the resources; some tasks might have a longer life-cycle than the time that
has been predicted by the scheduler due to e.g. locality. Consequently, there is flexibility
for extending the deadline until the job has been finished. This extension is important for
this study, because the profiling is based on the underlying processor core for which it is
important to know the behaviour or activities of the jobs and the duration of their assignment
in the processor cores. The details are given in Section 4.10.
1This is the adjustment process for power and speed settings in various processors in computing devices.
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4.3 Program Phase
This section describes the usage of the program phase proprieties in the experiments con-
ducted for the study, in which the HPC is utilised to capture the relevant events according
to the ML’s execution attributes to visualise the ML activities as phases with the aim of
identifying the iterations of the ML’s inner loop, which performs the observation of the
targeted memory addresses used by victims. This allows the execution analysis models for
the proposed framework to be able to capture and predict the potential iterations that might
occur per job, and which is assigned to one of the online processor cores, in order to bound
and extract the FLUSH+RELOAD attack activities in execution-time.
4.3.1 Program Phase Utilisation
Program phase has been utilised in various computational problems related to performance,
such as saving energy (Zhang and Chang, 2014) and performance tuning (Sherwood et al.,
2003a). Recent studies have found that the use of program phase leverages CPU scaling,
which relies on the correlation between memory and CPU workloads. Program phase
provides information to improve scheduler algorithms in the OS. For instance, Skrenes
and Williamson (2016) employed the Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS)
mechanism, which balances high speed CPU with memory access latency to avoid stalls
when the workload intends to fetch data from the cache memory. Furthermore, Zhang and
Chang (2014) used dynamic configuration CPU frequency to save CPU power. This guides
the system to switch the CPU frequency mode into a higher frequency rate when intensive
CPU usage is indicated and vice versa. In addition, the program phase has been utilised
in performance simulation tools to reduce the simulation time for benchmarks. This is
made possible by identifying the sections of code which have similar activities and can
be representative of the entire benchmark. Furthermore, the notion of a program phase
has been utilised in modern industrial processes such as chemical and biological industries.
Such industry systems rely on batch processes to generate products. Consequently, it is
recommended that these batch processes be monitored in order to ensure the products’ safety,
consistency, and reliability. Zhang et al. (2017) used program phase to capture information
about faulty cases in the system and feed machine learning algorithms to classify the normal
and faulty cases.
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4.3.2 Program Phase Definition
In the computational environment, the total computation of any program can be divided
into a set of intervals. Each interval is a slice of the program’s execution. A set of intervals
is composed to form a phase. The phase can occur multiple times within the program’s
execution. The transactions between two consecutive phases is called phase change Sherwood
et al. (2003a).
Program execution behaviours vary from program to program including large-scale ones
(Lau et al., 2005). Thus, Dhodapkar and Smith (2003) categorised program phases into stable
phase and phase changes. Stable phases are indicated if two or more phases have exactly
similar activities, otherwise phase changes are indicated. The presence of phase changes
indicates that the phase has been incurred with computational noise. Furthermore, phase
detection relies on the nature of a program. The program may be a memory transactions
or instruction stream Ding et al. (2006); Sherwood et al. (2003a). In addition, in some
circumstances, it is hard to distinguish phase transition; however, selecting relevant events
has a positive impact on phase detection by signalling the transactions between phases Ding
et al. (2006).
4.3.3 Malicious Loop Phase Modelling
Recall that the main part of a FLUSH+RELOAD attack program body is a malicious loop
(ML), which steals secret key in AES; inside the ML, the two consecutive tasks are executed,
flush a targeted memory addresses, which are the range of the memory addresses in which
the AES look-up table is stored, using clflush instruction and are followed by access to the
flushed address continuously. Thus, in the ML structure, each phase has a set of intervals of
similar execution activities. The activities are the consumption of the hardware resources
such as the L1, L2 and LLC caches. Any clflush instruction causes an equal number of
cache misses at each hierarchical cache level, when the next access is achieved. As L1 and
L2 are private per core, high frequency context switches have more influences on L1 and
L2 misses than LLC. This leads to the visualisation of ML phases by noting that LLC cache
misses have clear phase transactions between two adjacent (or neighbouring) phases. Figure
4.1 depicts the complete program phase of Flush+Reload from start to end in user space by
capturing E1 and E2; and in this case the Flush+Reload program runs for a short period of
time for the presentation purpose. However, when utilising Flush+Reload in real systems,
the loop boundary is much longer in order to retrieve the entire key bits (as described by
Irazoqui et al. (2015)). Figure 4.1 - (a) represents LLC cache misses in a more organised way
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than for Figure 4.1 - (b) which is E2. To gain insight into a short period of the Flush+Reload
execution in Figure 4.1 - (a), Figure 4.2 magnifies 100 samples out of 4000, in which the
phase transactions between every two consequent phases can clearly be seen. Furthermore,
choosing a proper sample duration allows profiling to be synchronised with the ML. This
feature is useful in the proposed framework because the observation of ML jobs plays a
significant role in detection and identification, so it is crucial to make the ML loop iteration
activities as distinct as possible from other workload activities.
However, the phases of a program are decomposed into sub-phases in execution-time.
Recall that each task of the program is fragmented into jobs, represented (or visualised)
in sub-phases, and shuffled with jobs of other programs, so that the jobs are queued by
scheduler for execution; and the task scheduler fairly distributes them across online processor
cores. Each of such sub-phases appears in between other sub-phases of other workloads
in user space. Figure 4.19 shows the sub-phases of the Flush+Reload program which are
distributed across other sub-phases of other programs in the same processor core’s execution
timeline (the execution time is sliced for the mixture of jobs of running programs in user
space). The sub-phases of the ML can be recognised across sub-phases of other programs,
but the points that indicate the phase transition are hard to capture. HPCs can virtualise
sub-phase transactions between two different sub-phases of two independent programs by
relying on the ML behaviour based on their execution attributes. This transaction can be
used to extract the ML activities across existing workloads in the computational environment.
However, defining sub-phases is not an easy task in heterogeneous workload due to changes
in program behaviours during run time which are leveraged by dynamic hardware adoption
and configuration, but selecting the most relevant and efficient event to characterise ML leads
to distinct ML sub-phases across other workloads.
4.4 Threat Model and Assumptions
This section illustrates the potential Flush+Reload attack on microprocessor caches. The at-
tacker exploits hardware and OS vulnerabilities by utilising intentional hardware contentions
with a victim’s processes, while both the attacker and victim are synchronised, in shared
environments in which hardware resources, such as CPU caches, are fairly shared across
running applications in both native and cloud systems. The attacker and victim use an AES
algorithm to encrypt plain text. An AES algorithm is implemented in crypto.so, which is a
shared library in an OpenSSL package and it is installed in the host OS Ubuntu 14.04. The
attackers can be a malicious program in the host OS or VM in the guest OS. The attacker
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Fig. 4.1 Signature of the attacker program in the native system shows the behaviour of the
Flush+Reload program and how it interacts with underlying hardware during its execution
Fig. 4.2 Signature of the attacker program in the native system shows the behaviour of the
Flush+Reload program and how it interacts with underlying hardware during its execution
and transparently provides interfaces to access HPCs. It is assumed that no malicious bodies
have access to the PHCs to modify settings and distort the observations.
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analyses the hardware cache contentions to deduce the AES secret keys. More details about
the attack thread are given in Section 3.3. Moreover, more than one Flush+Reload attack is
running concurrently in the system. Besides, it is assumed that the host OS is trusted.
4.5 The Framework Approach
This section introduces the key components and the main idea of the proposed framework
in this thesis, and its influences on the system performance. As has been mentioned in
the previous section, side channel attacks make use of a malicious loop to complete the
observation task by generating intentional contentions synchronously with the victim on the
CPU cache, particularly the LLC. The contentions are the primary source for the attackers
to discover information of interest such as the memory transactions of secret elements. On
the other hand, most attackers are not aware on their unintentional contentions. Figure 4.1
depicts the attack pattern which is produced from unintentional memory contentions. It is
worth paying attention to any ongoing ML in the system. The attack activities in Figure
4.1 are presented in the best-case scenario, in which the only attacker program is running
on a specific processor core from the beginning of its execution to the completion. But, in
real-time the scheduler time is sliced for all running programs in the system, and they are
executed by the CPU in an out of control manner. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish such
malicious activities among concurrent programs. For this reason, program phase detection
mechanisms have been used to efficiently construct the attack activities, which are sliced
and distributed across processor cores, by exploiting the efficient utilisation of the HPCs to
investigate the ML activities.
Besides this, the proposed detection system in this study performs detection first then
identification. In detection, a supervised machine learning approach is utilised in user-space,
whereas in the identification phase, the tasks are deployed in kernel-space. The computational
cost in user-space is cheaper than that in kernel-space, because the program executions in
kernel-space have higher priority than in user-space, and most of the kernel tasks are interrupt-
based. Interrupts incur high performance overheads in the system, because interrupt routines
have a higher priority than tasks in user-space in utilising hardware resources. This leads to
the system performing a context switch with every interrupt routine call. In a case where
the identification has a high number of False Negative cases, a high number of interrupts
will be triggered and adversely affect the performance overheads in the system. As a result,
efficient classification models are deployed in user-land first to avoid False Negative results.
A message will be sent to the identification phase only when attack activities have been
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found. In this case, the interrupt routines related to the identifications will be triggered only
when the attack(s) are detected. It is therefore essential that the classification model should
be sensitive to allow for successful detection of the attack. For this reason, program phase
detection mechanisms have been used to efficiently identify the ML loop repetitions and
apply a sum of aggregation function to bound the ML’s execution attributes in one data
point in the data-set before feeding them to the classification algorithms. Consequently, the
program phase supports the classifier to be more reliable and robust in detecting the ML
iterations.
4.6 Challenges
This section describes the challenges which are addressed in the framework.
Accuracy Accurate side channel attack detection systems must detect side channel attacks
with high accuracy. Recent research (Alam et al., 2017; Kulah et al., 2018; Payer, 2016) has
suggested machine learning as a good way to detect side channel attacks with high accuracy
and very low false positive rates, but the proposed methods rely on synchronisations, in this
case, factors like CPU workloads and dynamic hardware configurations (Allaf et al., 2017;
Briongos et al., 2017), and smart attacks (Del Pozo et al., 2015) have a negative impact on the
accuracy. Notwithstanding, the proposed detection system in this chapter does not rely on the
synchronisation approach, instead raw data, which is collected at processor core level, have
been used and extract the attack activities by utilising program phase detection mechanisms,
which contribute to detection efficiency and reliability, to instruct such activities.
Reliability, furthermore, (Payer, 2016) relies on perf in detection, in monitoring all processes
in the system by exploiting a proc file system, which is used by the perf tool. On the other
hand, Zhang et al. (2016a) monitor suspected malicious processes only. In both cases, the
attackers can escape the monitoring process. In contrast, the proposed detection system does
not rely on proc nor on monitoring only suspected processes; instead, every single program
execution activity at the processor core level will be captured and inspected to be checked for
being malicious or not. At this level of observation, no process activities are able to escape
observation, because there is an automatic data collection mechanism.
Identification is a separate process in the detection system. Recently, detection work has
focused on detecting side channel attacks without identifying the attacker. Recent works
(Gulmezoglu et al., 2017; Payer, 2016) proposed detection techniques but failed to identify
which processes or VMs have achieved side channel attacks. However, cloud providers are
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Fig. 4.3 An overview of the proposed framework (TrapMP)
keen to know attackers’ identities. The proposed work in this chapter can detect multiple
attacks in the system and identify the attacker.
4.7 The Framework Design (TrapMP)
TrapMP is a trapping method for capturing Malicious Processes (MP) at the processor core
level. The TrapMP is composed of two parts: the detection and identification phases. Both
phases rely on the usage of HPCs to support their models in detection and identification
tasks. The detection model is responsible for detecting ML activities in the system, whereas
the identification model is responsible for identifying the owner of the ML program. They
request information from the kernel module about the state of processor cores, because both
the detection and identification models run in user space; and programs in user space have no
access to HPCs; the details are given in Section 3.2.3. Figure 4.3 illustrates the high level of
the framework, in which the main components are shown, along with their hardware usages
and their communications. The yellow notations represent the whole process in chronological
order.
1. Detection Phase: In this phase, the detection model is responsible for detecting side
channel attacks, namely Flush+Reload in the system. The model utilises supervised
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machine learning algorithms to classify the attack activities which are achieved by the
attacker program in user space. The detection model continuously observes program
execution attributes on active processor cores from any ML activities. 1 The Detection
Agent (DA) sets up the communication channels with the Event Recorder Agent (ERA)
in kernel space to request S samples per processor core. 2 Then DA performs
prepossessing of raw data by applying shift and aggregation mean function to combine
n of consequent samples to capture ML sub-phases2. 3 The DA feeds the new data-
sets to the classifier to extract the attacks pattern. 4 The classifier sends back the
results to the DA. 5 The DA sends an alert to the identification phase if attack activities
have been detected.
2. Identification Phase:
Identification Phase: is responsible to identify the attackers by setting up a trap routine
to redirect the malicious program execution path to an interrupt routine. In the cloud
settings, the framework is capable of trapping the malicious VMs and identifying them
as having the same cost as the native system. 6 The Process Identifier Agent (PIA)
requests the Core Inspector Agent (CIA) to inspect any program execution attributes
related to the ML execution attributes. This is done by settings and initialising HPC
counters to investigate the state of each processor core. 7 If the values of the PMC
counters match the attack patterns, which relies on the statistical analysis model, then
the CIA will trigger an interrupt to suspend the MP and yield the necessary information
about the MP. 8 The CIA reports back details about the identification of the ML to
the PIA, Finally, the PIA reports back on the identity of the malicious processes or
VMs to the admin users.
4.8 Experiment Setup
Table 4.1 shows the hardware and software specifications for the experiments in this chapter.
4.9 Benchmark
Benchmark suites of programs are given by communities and companies with agreements
for them to be representatives and assess the relative performance of a system. They measure
performance of a piece of code, an application or a system. The Standard Performance
2sub-phase is described in section 4.3
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Type Specification
Hardware
Machine HP Proliant DL360G7
Microprocessor Intel Xeon X5650 2.66GHz
Main Memeory (RAM) 16GB
Software
OS Ubuntu 14.04
Visualisation Software Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM)
Benchmark SPEC cpu2006 suits benchmark
Targeted application AES in OpenSSL implementation
Table 4.1 Hardware and software specifications
Evaluation Corporation (SPEC) CPU2006 Benchmark suite (Henning, 2006) comprises
29 programs each representing a specific program type. For example, bzip2 represents
compression programs and GCC represents compiler applications. SPEC CPU2006 is mainly
used to evaluate performance for the new generation of computing systems and publish
them3. However, it has been widely used in program phase problems such as detecting their
phases in the computational environment (Sandberg et al., 2013; Sherwood et al., 2003b;
Zhang and Chang, 2014) and evaluating energy efficiency (Skrenes and Williamson, 2016).
Furthermore, it has been utilised in security domains. For instance, SPEC CPU2006 is used
to measure the accuracy of side channel attack detection systems Allaf et al. (2017) and
malware detection systems Malone et al. (2011). In this study, the SPEC CPU2006 suite has
used for testing the accuracy of detecting and identifying the attacker, and measuring the
incurred performance overhead by the proposed framework for the host OS.
4.10 Data Collection
In the experiment settings of this chapter, the data collection relies on HPCs to profile the
program execution attributes per processor core based on the shared execution time line
among processes in the system. As typical modern microprocessors have seven counters
to record the current state of each processor core, seven features of the program execution
attributes can be captured concurrently. The CPU of the machine which is used in the
experiments has seven PMC to record the processor core state. Thus, only seven events
are used to record memory transactions, stall and the number of cycles including three
fixed function counters and four programmable counters which are listed in Table 4.2. As
the PMC registers are auto counters, the duration is needed to indicate for how long the
registers holds the counting. This interval is very critical because the TrapMP wants to
3https://www.spec.org/cpu2006/results/
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extract individual iterations of ML. The length of time taken to complete each iteration in
ML in a Flush+Reload attack is approximately ≈ 0.02µs. A kernel module is implemented
to provide an interface between TrapMP and the MPC registers. As TrapMP is composed of
two phases – detection and identification phases – each has different settings for collecting
data. In the detection phase, the number of samples are much more than in the identification
phase ranging from 1000 to 4000 samples for detection and 5-20 samples for identification.
The detection phase continuously requires data, but the identification phase needs data when
it is informed that an attack has occurred in the system. Furthermore, to collect only program
execution activities in user-land, the OS and kernel execution activities will be excluded in
the counting by setting the bit number 16th for MSR registers to 1 (for more details on how











Table 4.2 Relevant events to side channel attack
The data are collected under different scenarios, for the purpose of labelling classes
(normal and attack) of the data-set; the selected programs for the experiments need to be run
alone in user-land to recognise their patterns. The target application in the experiments for
this chapter is the Flush+Reload attack program. Flush+Reload attack programs have been
run and assigned to a specific processor core by using affinity functions set
flush_reload -p 2.
4.10.1 Data Labelling
The collected data need to be labelled before feeding them to the classification algorithms.
In this study, binary classification is employed to classify malicious and benign behaviours.
All workloads in user space are considered benign except the side channel attack program
activities which are classified as malicious behaviour. To distinguish malicious behaviour, the
Flush+Reload program is run multiple times alone in user space to ensure that the profiling
records only the Flush+Reload program. Moreover, the taskset -c command is used to
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5: for each processor p in P do
6: for each core c in C do
7: for each s in S do
8: reset(PMCs)
9: wait(d)






Algorithm 2 Detection Algorithm
1: procedure DETECTION()
2: while True do
3: recv(samples)
4: temp = aggregation(samples)
5: alarm = classi f ier(temp)
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pin the Flush+Reload program to a specific processor core and request agent to monitor the
specified processor core.
4.11 Feature Selection and Thresholds
This section describes how to choose program execution attributes to identify the Flush+Reload
attack activities in RTS by utilising HPCs. Further, selecting the most relevant events to ML
has efficiently affect in detecting and identifying the attack activities.
In this study, the main data collection source is HPCs which is available in modern CPUs.
In a typical Intel microprocessor, HPCs support monitoring of hundreds of CPU-related
events. These events characterise program execution behaviours. However, these events
are not equally beneficial to address a specific problem. For instance, some of the events
might visualise the Flush+Reload execution attribute, such as L1, L2 and LLC misses,
which are more sensible than other events as shown in Figure 4.1, LLC clearly present the
phase transaction between every two consecutive iteration in ML. They therefore need to be
examined to find the most efficient events which offer better solutions to the problems. Recent
research Alam et al. (2017); Briongos et al. (2017); Zhang et al. (2016a) have used machine
learning algorithms to choose the most efficient events to support detection models, but in this
study, the events are chosen relying on the nature of the attack programs, particularly ML in
which the L1, L2 and LLC cache misses are equally be triggered, and the window size, which
indicate the interval that the specified events need to be counted. Therefore, in the following
subsections, Descriptive Statistic Functions (DS) are used to analyse the run-time execution
behaviour of the attack program to determine the thresholds and relationship between the
selected events which describe of the program execution attributes.
4.11.1 L1, L2 and LLC Misses Are the Best Features to describe ML
activities by Flush+Reload Attack programs
Feature selection in detecting side channel attacks at processor core level is critical because in
RTS it is hard to predict the possible workloads; and get the same observation of a program’s
execution activities due to randomness of resource assignments across processes by OS
scheduler. Consequently, it is crucial to find out events which virtualises the attack precisely
and less affected by those problems.
In this study we focus on the ML inside Flush+Reload program, which is the core part of
the program that efficiently explore the vulnerabilities. Thus, the main task of each iteration
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in ML is composed of clflush instruction and followed by mov instruction. The clflush
instruction removes the data from the hierarchical caches (L1, L2 and LLC) at a specific
memory address, whereas the mov instruction then accesses the flushed memory address from
main memory. The access to the flushed memory address requires n misses for each cache
level. So, we assume the n misses of (L1, L2 and LLC) will be occurred while the jobs of
ML is assigned to one of the active processor core. Consequently, a very strong co-relation
among L1, L2 and LLC caches can be noticed. This is the key intuition in the proposed
framework to detect and identify the attacker at processor core level observations.
However, clflush might be used by the operating system’s Memory Management Unit
(MMU) when MMU is not sure what to do with dirty cache lines, OS uses clflush. This
makes it possible to incur noise in the observations. But, Section 4.10 addresses this problem
and discusses ways of excluding the OS activities. Furthermore, noise may also interfere
with observations if clflush is used in user space by another program, in this case, causing
clflush instructions that were not initiated by the attack program to be visible in the
observations. It is, however, possible to identify the malicious loop with great accuracy
because of one of its particular characteristics: its repetition of not less than 25000 iterations,
which being the minimum number of operations required to retrieve every bit making up the
whole key in native systems (Irazoqui et al., 2015).
4.11.2 Descriptive Statistics to Describe Program Executions
Descriptive statistics are used to summarise experimentally generated data-sets for use
in feature selection and threshold identifications. Consequently, this section introduces
descriptive statistics as a mathematical tool to compare the execution attributes of the attack
program and SPEC workloads to show their low-level activities in fine-grained details and
to show how the DS supports the detection and identification models by identifying the
thresholds and relationship between features in the framework.
4.11.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
The main uses of descriptive statistics are to describe data-sets’ central tendency, variability
and distribution. A data-set’s tendency is found using mean and median, while the distribu-
tion’s variability and degree of skew are measured using min, max, variance and standard
deviation. A comparison of the program execution attributes’ statistical outputs allows us to
determine the program’s degree of uniqueness during program executions in real-time sys-
tems. Each statistical property has both strengths and weaknesses. As an example, the outlier
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is the commonest descriptive statistics problem. It has negative impact on measurements,
especially median and variance properties. The use to which descriptive statistics and their
errors are put depends on the nature of the case study. This study shows not all descriptive
statistics properties to be equally useful in the analysis of program execution attributes, and
so different properties are used by different features. Mean and standard deviation are mainly









δF = Standard deviation of feature f
X f ,n = ith sample in f th feature
X¯ = the mean of X f ,i
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X f ,i (4.2)
The features are analysed individually to extract program execution attributes in both
native and cloud systems, and this is where descriptive statistics are useful. The next section
analyses the program execution attributes using descriptive statistics tools.
4.11.3 Defining Thresholds
This section illustrates selection of candidate features and thresholds as parameters in the
detection and identification model to contain the attacker program, and fleshes out the
illustration using Descriptive Statistics to analyse program execution attributes.
4.11.3.1 Distribution
Section 4.4 showed that (L1 and LLC) cache misses are the optimal events describing
Flush+Reload activities, particularly ML. Ten experiments were conducted each with 1,000
samples and only the attack program was running, and it was pinned to a specific processor
core. The distribution of L2 and LLC cache misses of the attack in native system is shown in
Figure 4.5, where the area beneath the red line shows the LLC misses distribution and the
4.11 Feature Selection and Thresholds 87
Fig. 4.4 Is the different L3 and L1 cache misses which is considered as noise
Fig. 4.5 L1 and L3 cache misses distribution of the attacker’s program in cloud systems
area under the green line is L1 cache misses distribution. They are almost congruent with
each other, showing that they are issuing almost the same cache miss rates.
As shown in Figure 4.5, LLC is still constant when the attack program runs with SPEC
workloads, but there is a slight change in L2 cache misses. The workload variation is shown
in Figure 4.5 (a), where the area inside the red line is the original cache misses, and the area
inside the green line represents noise filtered out by E2 event.
However, turning to cloud systems, Figure 4.5 (b) shows poor overlap between L1 and
LLC, and this is the result of noise causing misses in L1 and L2 cache because of the VM’s
extra translation layer. As already discussed, the L2_RQST S.DEMAND_DATA_RD_HIT
event can remove the noise. In Figure 4.5(b), the area under the green line shows the noise
from L1 cache misses penalty and the area under the red line is the actual L2 and LLC cache
misses penalty.
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4.11.3.2 Program Execution Instability - Tendency
Due to the runtime dynamic optimisation system, the OS utilises cl f lush instruction to
remove stale translation from the cache Bala et al. (2011). The purpose of the tendency is to
address the variation of the program behaviour in real time systems.
Understanding program behaviour is at the foundation of computer architecture and
program optimization. Many programs have wildly different behaviour on even the very
largest of scales (over the complete execution of the program). During one part of execution
a program may be completely memory bound while in another it may always be stalling on
branch mispredictions. Due to this time-varying behaviour of programs.
In profiling, the most obvious obstacle is the instability of run-time program executions,
which varies between experiments even though the configuration is the same. Sherwood
et al. Sherwood et al. (2003b) investigated that the program behaviour can change many
time. For instance, some programs in real systems are stable , but some are not such as in
SPEC CPU2006 bizp2 has more stable program phases than gcc (Sherwood et al., 2003a).
This can mean missing an attack program’s real-time activities when attempting to extract
the execution attributes of the attack program from the observed data. Tendency is the
way to overcome this problem. Twenty experiments were conducted to show possible LLC
cache miss patterns. LLC was chosen for reasons set out in section 4.11.3.1: LLC does not
change with changing workloads. A variation was seen from run to run, and the problem was
addressed using tendency. Failure to handle unsuitability properly can reduce the likelihood
of detecting malicious processes, because patterns that take time to present themselves need
the matching algorithm to wait until the pattern is seen. Failure to handle unsuitability
properly can reduce the likelihood of detecting malicious processes, because patterns that
take time to present themselves need the matching algorithm to wait until the pattern is seen.
Figure 4.6 shows a range of frequencies for LLC cache misses from 9 to 22 in this setting.
These figures were collected from twenty experiments sorted into three groups (G1, G2 and
G3) as shown in Figure 4.6. Each pattern (G1, G2 or G3) occurs whenever the experiment is
run. Each group has a range of figures indicating that they can be obtained from the counters
during the experiment. In this experiment, G1 occurs more often than G2 and G3 – but that
should not be taken as indicating that this always happens. It can also be seen that each group
comprises three or four figures, one of which is a candidate for the highest frequency. Group
G1 has four figures in the range 11, 12, 13 and 14. The highest in the group is 13, meaning
that 13 is more likely than the others to be the one that occurs when the pattern is captured.
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Fig. 4.6 L1 and L3 cache misses tendency of the attacker’s program
4.11.3.3 Comparison of Feature Variability
In the identification phase, the matching algorithm looks for a feature for which the variation
is as close to zero as possible to form the starting point for checking for an attacker program’s
presence on a processor core. Variability is measured using Standard Deviation (STD)
in order to find the events in the attack program with the least deviation across different
workloads.
Native Systems: In Table 4.3, the STD column shows the STD of four programmable
counters, counting (L1 Instruction hit, L1 cache misses, L2 cache misses and LLC cache
misses). As will be seen, the lowest STD (≈ 0.25) belongs to L3 cache misses of the attack
program running alone in a native system. Row FR+SPEC shows the events under four SPEC
applications. Except for a slight increase in L2 cache misses, the data shows no significant
variances.
Cloud Systems: In Table 4.4, column STD gives the STD of four programmable counters:
L1 Instruction hit, L1 cache misses, L2 cache misses and LLC cache misses. The lowest
STD (≈ 0.25) was for LLC cache misses of the attack program running in a cloud system.
When the attack program runs in cloud systems together with SPEC benchmarks, LLC has
the lowest STD at 2.
In the Cloud settings, the lowest STD is for CPU_CLK_UNHALTED.REF_TSC and the
highest is for INST _RET IRED.ANY . The STD of fixed counters in both native and Cloud
settings are might higher than for programmable counters, and so the identification phase
cannot rely for detection on fixed counters.
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Programs Events
Statistics




E1 0.036524 0.250817 0 11
E2 15.166787 3.018877 11 32
E3 0.008996 0.631708 0 47




C E1 0.036524 0.250817 0 11
E2 15.166787 3.018877 11 32
E3 0.008996 0.631708 0 47
E4 15.130263 3.0017 11 22
Table 4.3 Describes the necessary statistics to support statistical analysis to find the best
features and thresholds. This statistic is the key for process identification. The data is
collected in a native system and outliers are removed
Programs Events
Statistics




E1 1 2 3 4
E2 23.61 10.93 11 130
E3 3.88 14.79 0 252
E4 16.92 2.90 10 22
Table 4.4 Describes the necessary statistics to support statistical analysis to find the best
features and thresholds. This statistic is the key for process identification. The data is
collected in cloud system and outliers have been removed from the data
In summary, this analysis shows LLC and L2 misses to be the two candidates that can
be used in the matching algorithm, because their values are identical except when SPEC
applications also run, in which case L2 changes with a very low variance. Using L2 hit
allows this variance to be filtered out from L2 misses.
4.11.3.4 Min and Max
The thresholds of fixed counters are found using Min and Max properties. Although profiling
results suggest that this range can be inferred from other workloads, the logical approach
is to use the fixed counter thresholds after four programmable counters have been checked.
Figures 4.7 shows the ranges of three fixed counters using Min and Max priorities in native
and cloud system respectively. Changing the workload changes the range.
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Programs Events
Statistics
Mean STD Min Max
Native
E5 20872 5751.47 1200 36939
E6 18608 4607.69 2107 29894
E7 18594 4613.49 2124 29878
Cloud
E5 29907 5751.47 1500 36939
E6 26567 4607.69 2107 49894
E7 26586 4613.49 2124 49878
Table 4.5 Describes the necessary statistics to support statistical analysis to find the best
features and thresholds. This statistic is the key for process identification. The data is
collected from native and cloud systems and outliers have been removed from the data
Fig. 4.7 Min and Max of each fixed counters of attacker program in native system
4.12 Detection Phase
This section describes the detection phase of the framework. In this section, the detection
models are described and the machine learning algorithms are utilised with the comparison
to three classification techniques.
4.12.1 Moving Window Aggregation (MWA)
The aggregation mean function is employed to find the related samples which belong to
a single job in ML. As a scheduler cannot be controlled in terms of assigning jobs to the
online processor cores and the duration of the assignments, the default is to guess how many
samples belong to a job and for how long a processor core holds the job. Consequently,
giving raw data to the machine learning algorithms will negatively impact on the performance
of the classifiers in detecting side channel attacks. Thus, we leveraged the MWA algorithm.
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Fig. 4.8 Aggregation and five shifts of the data-set. shi f t5 represents the best aggregation
which captures the whole samples of one of the ML jobs, which is counted as an attack
activity
To construct the phases of the ML by finding the set of consequent samples in execution time,
which belong to the ML jobs.
MWA is the process of partitioning the data-set D which has N samples with F features
into subsets D¯. Each subset contains the consequent n samples, when n⊆ N, and F features;
and averages them to produce one sample which represents one ML phase. As a result, a
new data-set D¯i will be generated with the length of
n
N
samples. This is to transform each
the ML phases n into one sample and this will be classified as attack activities. Still it is
not guaranteed that the whole body of the phase will be captured, because there might be
a sample from the neighbour jobs of other workloads which will interfere with the ML
phases. To overcome this problem, the original data-set will be shifted n times and the
same procedure split and the mean function for each subset will be repeated to generate n of
D¯ = {D¯1, D¯2, .., D¯n}, where n is also the threshold which indicates less than the maximum
length of the ML samples which might appear in each ML phase in real-time. The whole data-
set will be given to the classifier to allow more chance to detect any potential ML activities.
The MWA algorithm provides reliability and robustness in the detection system, because
it tries to extract and capture each ML phase by combining the chronological sequence of
samples which belong to each ML job in execution-time.
Figure 4.8 illustrates 10 samples of the original data-set with Fi representing LLC cache
misses when F = {F1,F2,F3, ...,Ff } fi ∈ F . The same operation will be applied to each
Fi+1 when i = {1,2, ..., f}. This figure consists of five sub-figures each representing one
round of the shift to generate n new D¯i. The single column on the left-hand side represents
the mean function of n samples, when n = 5 in this example. With these execution settings,
the LLC cache miss is equal to 14; more details are given in the previous section on how to
choose the LLC cache miss. Thus, the average of n samples should be 14. In shi f t5 the five
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Fig. 4.9 Detection model overview
green samples are aggregated and averaged to 14. Thus, 14 represents one of the ML phases
in real-time.
4.12.2 Detection Model Overview
Figure 4.9 illustrates the detection systems, of which the general concept is described in this
section. Step 1 : the detection system communicates with the Event Recorder Agent (ERA)
for the collection of data from the PMC counters. The ERA is a model-based implementation
because the PMC counters can only be written to with the kernel’s permission. The ERA
profiles all the jobs which are currently assigned to the online processor cores as raw data.
Within a loop inside ERA, the samples with a specific interval will be recorded. The duration
of the loop is related to a possibility that the attacker cannot escape observation. For instance,
if the attacker requires approximately one minute, as is the case in (Irazoqui et al., 2014), the
ERA starts profiling at half the time of the required time which the attackers need to retrieve
the whole secret key and feeds this to the DA for classification. Step 2 takes place inside the
DA; the off-line data need to be prepared by applying the MWA 4.12.1 algorithm aggregated
with average function and then labelled relying on the thresholds, which are indicated in
Section 4.11.3. After labelling, the data-set will be split into train and test data-sets. Step 3
the training data-set is then fed to the machine learning algorithms including (k-NN, C4.5 or
random forest) to build the classifier 4 . Step 5 the online data will be collected again. Step
6 then the new data are prepared by applying the MWA algorithm, but without labelling
them. Step 7 the classifiers predict the unseen samples to detect any attack activities in the
system.
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Algorithm 3 Detection Algorithm
1: procedure DETECTION()
2: while True do
3: recv(samples)
4: temp = aggregation(samples)
5: alarm = classi f ier(temp)






In the previous section, synchronisation-based detection of side channel attacks was con-
ducted by comparing three machine learning algorithms PCANN, k-NN and Decision Tree
algorithms in which the decision tree outperformed the k-NN and PCANN under various
workloads, light and heavy, to notice how the workloads influence the classifier’s performance
in terms of detecting side channel attacks. In this chapter, the side channel attack program
will be monitored at the processor core level without the detection being synchronised with
attacker programs. In this approach, three different supervised machine learning algorithms
have been used by considering the single tree algorithm C4.5, see Section 3.4.4, light weight
algorithm k-NN, see Section 3.4.3, and random forest, which will be described in detail in
conjunction with the limitation of single tree algorithms in this section.
In the previous chapter, we investigated how Decision Tree algorithms outperformed
other algorithms. However, Decision Tree (DT) algorithms have limitations in terms of
accuracy and efficiency like any learning algorithms. The common problems in Decision
Tree algorithms are well known as relating to over-fitting and under-fitting, which are
described in Section 3.4.0.2. With overfitting, the classifier is trained very well on the
training data-set, but cannot be generalised to the testing data-set. This means that Decision
Tree algorithms are sensitive to the specific data-set on which they are trained on, but fail for
a testing data-set. This is because the algorithm takes into account every data point including
outliers in the training data-set as shown in Figure 4.10. Consequently, the classifier is
only poorly generalised to the new samples. In contrast, under-fitting is missing important
structural information about the sample space due to insufficient training samples. Therefore,
Breiman (1996b) decomposed the over-fitting error into bias and variance to overcome such
problems. Single tree-based algorithms have low bias and high variance. High variance
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Fig. 4.10 Over-fitting problem on training data-set
affects detection accuracy negatively. However, constraints (e.g. length of the tree) can be
used to optimise the tree model accuracy, but single tree predictors suffer from generalisation
problems.
As a result, Breiman (1996a) introduced ensemble methods to avoid the variance problem
by constructing many prediction models and training them with subsets, which are produced
by splitting data points in the original data-set, and combining their decisions to improve
accuracy and robustness over the prediction of an individual model. Ensemble methods are
mainly categorised into bagging, which is based on randomisation, and boosting techniques
(Geurts and Louppe, 2011). In spite of the fact that the boosting technique has gained the
attention of researchers and has been applied in various domains successfully (Sayadi et al.,
2018), the focus in this study is on the bagging technique.
Bagging (short for Bootstrap aggregating) was introduced by Breiman (1996a) is an
ensemble learning technique to decrease the variance of a predictor by bootstrapping samples
with replacements from the original data-set to train prediction models of any supervised ma-
chine learning algorithms and aggregating their results to select the best predictor. Algorithm
4 explains the steps of a typical bagging algorithm with minimum requirements.
The bagging algorithm, firstly, enrols a constructive loop to generate NL subsets in a
random space (choosing randomly from replacements) from the original data-set D and
learner algorithm LA of the same algorithm. Secondly, after generating a vector of LA, the
aggregation function selects the best learner Cbest from the LA. Since Bagging is utilised in
classification and regression problems, the aggregation Max function is used for classification
problems to select the best learner who has the most votes among internal predictors; thus,
aggregation is calculated in Equation 4.3, whereas, the aggregation Mean function is used for
regression problems to average the results of the learners L; thus, aggregation is calculated in
Equation 4.4. The focus in this chapter is on the classification problem.
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Algorithm 4 Bagging Algorithm
1: procedure BAGGING_CLASSIFIER(LA,D,NL)
2: LA Learner Algorithm
3: D Original Data-set
4: NL Number of learners
5: Cbest Final ensemble learners
6: for i=1,2,...,NL do
7: Si = BootstrappingSample(D)
8: Li = LA(Si)
9: end for


















Random forest is the implementation of the ensemble concept by using a bagging tech-
nique to construct a collection of Decision Trees. Random forest reduces over-fitting, which
is generated by single tree algorithms, by utilising bagging (Barandiaran, 1998) technique.
The Bagging technique in the random forest algorithm, uses a subspace randomisation
scheme to re-sample, with replacements, the training subsets which are used to grow new
individual trees. In the random forest algorithm, the base models are tree structured models.
The tree models in the forest can be generated by any Tree algorithms such as CART, C4.5
or ID3.
Breiman (2001), for the first time, introduced random forest to decrease variance, which
is generated by a single tree-based predictor, by constructing many internal tree predictors
on CART algorithm in the forest, each of which is trained on an independent random sample
derived from the original data-set with replacements. Furthermore, each random sample is
composed of random features to increase the chance of contributing the maximum number
of features in the splitting processes, which is also called diversity. Algorithm 5 illustrates
the process of the random forest algorithm for classification problems.
4.12 Detection Phase 97
Algorithm 5 Random Forest Algorithm
1: procedure BAGGING_CLASSIFIER(TLA,D,NL)
2: T LA Tree Learner Algorithm
3: D Original Data-set
4:
5: NL Number of learners
6: TCbest Final tree classifier
7: for i=1,2,...,NL do
8: Si = BootstrappingSample(D)
9: TCi = T L(Si)
10: end for






Firstly, the algorithm enrols a constructive loop to generate a vector of bootstrap samples
S from the original data-set D. Each bootstrap sample is denoted as Si. The tree algorithm
(CART) is used to grow a vector of tree classifiers TC on the Si bootstrap sample. Each Si is
composed of a subset of features which are randomly chosen from the data-set f ⊆ F , where
F is the full set of the features in the original data-set. Then the new tree nodes split on the
best features in f rather than F . Secondly, after generating a vector of TC, the aggregation
function selects the best tree classifier TCbest from the TC. Aggregation Max function is
used to select the best tree classifier which has the most votes among internal predictors.
Class imbalance in binary classification occurs when the majority of class instances
(normal activities) outnumbers the minority class instances (attack activities). Previous
research has shown that the negative impact of imbalanced problem is present in real-world
classification problems (Galar et al., 2012; Li, 2007; Nikulin et al., 2009; Rokach, 2016),
particularly in malware studies (Zhang et al., 2016b). Furthermore, for the collected data
in the experiments for this chapter, the attacker’s ML activities have a lower number of
instances than normal workloads activities, which is of interest from the point of view of
the learning task. This will lead the classification model to have a negative impact on the
classification accuracy of unseen data.
Standard machine learning techniques may be leveraged by the majority class and ignored
by the minority class in prediction (Rokach, 2016). This means that the minority classes
are ignored to contribute to the classification task. To overcome this problem, Cieslak and
Chawla (2008) suggested the use of a base induction single tree algorithm by splitting the
criteria in tree algorithms. Furthermore, creating synthetic data-sets is another solution for the
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classification problems in imbalanced data-sets. Under-sampling in data-sets reduces the size
of the majority of data classes (Japkowicz, 2000), whereas in over-sampling of data-sets, the
minority class(es) instances are increased Chawla et al. (2002). On the other hand, Li (2007)
used the Bagging technique to resolve an imbalanced data-set without creating synthetic data
or making changes to the existing classification systems.
Random forest has many applications for balanced and imbalanced data-sets. It has
received a lot of attention from researchers in imbalanced data-sets because random forest
encourages diversity (Nikulin et al., 2009). This was achieved by introducing an ensemble
approach to the base algorithm by replacing a new splitting criterion and producing many
tree classifiers instead of one tree to make a decision (e.g. ensemble approach). A decision as
a whole can be used to mitigate the classification in an imbalanced data-set. This approach
works by creating a forest of tree classifiers where each individual classifier is trained using
a balanced subset, where all minority classes are included with randomly chosen majority
classes. The reason for using ensemble methods is to imbalance data-sets (Rokach, 2016).
4.12.4 Experimental Design
The design of the experiments in this chapter can be summarised in two phases. In the
first phase, the data collection is performed in native and cloud systems with ten-fold cross
validation (CV) executed for each. In each CV, a new data-set is constructed from different
data points from the original data-sets then the new data-set is divided into 70% training and
30% testing data so that all data points contribute to the model building stage.
In the second phase, three different machine learning algorithm techniques have been used
including a single tree algorithm C.45, a light weight algorithm k-NN and a random forest
bagging algorithm. With each CV iteration, the new training data-set is fed to each algorithm
to build a classifier and then the new testing data-set is used to evaluate the classifier.
4.12.5 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, the results of the experiments are shown for each Decision Tree C4.5, k-NN
and random forest algorithm and they are visualised by utilising ROC Area Under Curve
(AUC). The figures in this section depict the performance of classifiers in discriminating
between two process activities which are normal and attack.
In ROC-AUC figures, the classifiers’ outputs are represented as ROC curves. Each ROC
represents recall (sensitivity) against specificity at incremental thresholds between zero and
one across 10 folds when the same data-set is randomly shuffled, resulting in each fold
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having a different spread of data. The Y axis plots the classifier outputs’ True Positives Rates
(recall) and the X axis plots False Positive Rates (specificity). Each fold is an individual
ROC and is represented by a light blue line which is detection quality. The solid blue line is
the mean of 10 classifiers. The ideal representation is when the ROC curves have x=0 and
y=1. This indicates that the classifiers classify normal and attack classes in unseen samples
100% of the time.
When the classifier has predicted unseen data-sets, its accuracy is evaluated to test
how efficient it is at extracting Flush+Reload activities. The two characteristics, recall and
specificity, are plotted along a ROC curve. The ROC was put forward by Bradley (1997);
Fawcett (2006) to enable performance metrics via a predictive model by drawing line graphs
connecting recall and specificity. A point on the curve will signify a ratio between 0 and 1.
Since the halfway point on this curve represents a random guess, the diagonal connects the
points (0.5,0.5). Anything above that diagonal will be more accurate than a random guess,
and the actual position enables its accuracy to be characterised on a continuum from good to
excellent, with the very best performance closest to the top right corner. Anything below the
diagonal is likely to be even less accurate than a random guess.
4.12.5.1 k-NN Results
Figure 4.11 and 4.12 show the ROC metric that evaluates the k-NN classifiers’ ability to
detect the ML activities among normal workloads in the host system in both native and cloud
settings respectively. Success in observing program execution attributes and classifying
processes as malicious or benign, as a measure of the risk of existing side channel attack in
the system, is shown as being estimated by the AUC of ROC. The model identifies the ML
in a native system with very high accuracy (AUC=0.99 for an average of 10 folds, with a
zero-confidence interval) Figure 4.11. In the cloud, however, the same algorithm is trained on
a data-set that captured the fact that VM activities were less accurate at predicting malicious
activities from among other workloads (AUC=0.96, confidence interval=0.02) Figure 4.12.
The classifier is therefore 3% less efficient at identifying malicious loop activities in the
cloud than in a native system.
Recall, Flush+Reload frequently repeats the same task, which is organised by executing
the clflush instruction to a specific memory address of interest and then executing mov to the
same address. When it receives the memory address from which to read the contents, mov
must retrieve them from memory pages because the previous clflush rendered the contents
in hierarchical cache memory at that address, and invalid contents are updated from main
memory leading to a sequence of hardware events. Cache misses at L1, L2 and LLC are the
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Fig. 4.11 ROC-AUC for k-NN algorithm in the native system
Fig. 4.12 ROC-AUC for k-NN algorithm in the cloud system
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events selected, as executing two consecutive instructions produces an equal number of L1,
L2 and LLC cache misses. This sets the attack program apart from other workloads as shown
in the SPEC benchmark suite which includes two integer applications (bzip2 and gcc) and
two floating applications (bwaves and dealII). It is this particularity that enables the k-NN
algorithm to build a model identifying the malicious loop in the computational environment
with high accuracy. The AMW corroborate the classifier’s reliability by slicing the data-set
into a sequence of windows of equal size to be searched for phases of the ML. The ML is
then seen to be repeating the same task of flushing specific memory address.
The results in Figure 4.11 and 4.12 demonstrate the ability of the k-NN algorithm which
builds a classifier that is very accurate in identifying ML activities used by the Flush+Reload
attack in both native and cloud systems. k-NN is a distance-based algorithm using the search
engine to perform classification by finding the closest samples in the data-set. When the ML
is achieved, the three features (L1, L2 and LLC) have the shortest distance, which is zero in
native systems. In cloud systems, on the other hand, the noise in L1 and L2 caches slightly
reduces the classifier’s accuracy.
Another advantage found in these results is that the profiling can record native and
cloud-based activities for the same cost. The same classifier does not require training with
different data-sets, and the same data-set can be used to train the classifier to detect malicious
processes which are either belong to native or VM process but there will be a 3% degradation
in the classifier’s accuracy in cloud settings due to the noise.
4.12.5.2 Single Tree C4.5 Results
Figure 4.13 is the ROC metric to evaluate the quality of the single tree classifier in detecting
ML activities among normal workloads in the host system. The figure represents the tree
classifier’s ability to observe program execution attributes and classify the online workloads
into malicious and normal activities to measure the risk of existing side channel attack in the
system as estimated by ROC-AUC. The model can classify the implicit ML activities inside
the Flush+Reload program with accuracy (AUC=0.99 for an average of 10 folds, with a
zero confidencezero-confidence interval) in a native system. However, the same algorithm is
trained on a data-set which captures the VM activities in a system in which the cloud system
is installed in the host OS. The classifier has a lower ability to predict malicious activities
among other workloads in the same setting as the native system (AUC=0.89, confidence
interval=0.1); the classifier extracts the ML activities with 1% less efficient when identifying
the ML activities in the cloud than in native systems. This is because the noise was incurred to
L1 and L2 cache memories and the cache misses were increased. This is due to the additional
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Fig. 4.13 ROC-AUC for single tree algorithm (C4.5) in a native system
translation layer in the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) setting in which the hypervisor hides
this layer for security reasons across VMs.
The results in 4.13 and 4.14 depict the performance of the C4.5 algorithm in detecting
ML activities in the computational environments for both native and cloud workloads. C4.5
grows a tree model to extract the ML activity patterns among various workloads in the
system. As can be seen in Figures 4.13 and 4.14, the tree model performance decreases by
1% in the cloud system. This is because C4.5 produces a single tree classifier to predict
unseen data points from new data-sets which have failed to contribute relevant features and
all samples to support diversity. This leads to both problems of under-fitting and over-fitting.
For over-fitting, the model is affected by instability in the execution as mentioned in Section
4.11.3.2. During the side channel program execution, the number of cache misses varies.
There might be different ranges of ML execution attributes in training and testing sets. As a
result of this, the model can classify very effectively in training but fails for the testing data
because the data points in the testing set are not the same as for the training set. Furthermore,
in imbalanced data-sets, there is no chance to contribute all data points to the training data-set.
However, CV has been used to shuffle the original data-set when the new data-set is created.
This is because the model is built on the training set, and new data points might be introduced
to the model, and it would be difficult to recognise them.
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Fig. 4.14 ROC-AUC for single tree algorithm (C4.5) in a cloud system
4.12.5.3 Bagging-Random Forest Results
Figures 4.15 and 4.16 show the ROC metric that evaluates the random-forest classifier’s
ability to detect the ML activities among normal workloads in the host system in both native
and cloud settings respectively. Success in observing program execution attributes and
classifying processes as malicious or benign as a measure of the risk of existing side channel
attack in the system is shown as estimated by the AUC of ROC. The model identifies ML
in a native system with very high accuracy (AUC=0.99 for an average of 10 folds, with a
zero confidence interval) 4.15. In the cloud, however, the same algorithm, when trained on
a data-set that captured VM activities, was less accurate at predicting malicious activities
from among other workloads (AUC=0.99, confidence interval=0.01), as shown in Figure
4.16. The classifier therefore has the same efficiency at identifying malicious loop activities
in native and cloud systems. The noise incurred by L1 and L2 cache memories, which
arises from the additional translation layer imposed by Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS),
has less impact in the random forest model as compared with C4.5 and k-NN. However,
the results in Figures 4.12 and 4.14 show that the instability in program execution has a
negative impact on the classifier’s performance. However, random forest outperformed for
single Decision Tree C4.5 and k-NN. This is because random forest utilises a bootstrapping
technique 4.12.3 in which all data points in the data-set are involved in model building,
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Fig. 4.15 ROC-AUC for bagging algorithm (random forest) in a native system
particularly in the imbalanced data-set. Random forest tries to generate implicit balanced
data-sets by bootstrapping the original data-sets; in each data-set, the minor class (attack
class) is always placed first, followed by the major class for both training and testing sets, in
which case the model is well-trained on the training and testing sets to eliminate under-fitting
problems.
4.12.6 Performance
This section reports on the performance overhead which is generated by the detection model.
In this experiment, the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark was running for about 13 hours with and
without the detection model. The detection model was running in user space and continuously
communicating with the Event Record Agent (ERA) to collect data and feed the detection
model for malicious activities. Figures 4.17 and 4.18 depict the host OS performance with
and without the detection model respectively. The results suggest that the detection model
has a very low impact on the performance of the host system; even in the worst case, the
performance overhead is within 0.03.
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Fig. 4.16 ROC-AUC for bagging algorithm (random forest) in a cloud system
Fig. 4.17 The performance overhead without the detection model using SPEC 2006 bench-
mark
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Fig. 4.18 The performance overhead while the detection model is running and SPEC 2006
benchmark
4.12.7 Discussion
In this chapter, we have reported on experiment results reflecting on issues which have
an impact on the performance of detection and its robustness in detecting side channel
attacks in both native and cloud systems. Our solution is based on three different supervised
machine learning techniques and chooses the best algorithm for the detection model. The
results suggest that the random forest method can be competitive in detecting side channel
attacks. However, feature selection is the core of the detection phase in terms of extracting
Flush+Reload attack activities in the computational environment 4.11. This is due to the fact
that the detection task is not an easy task due to profiling program execution at the processor
core level, in which every single memory transaction will be recorded without knowing the
process id PID of the achieved transactions and the duration of the transactions, which means
that there is no information about the transactions. Thus, selecting the features which are
strongly relevant to the attack activities is essential. Based on the results in Section 4.11,
we found that L1, L2 and LLC cache misses have a linear relationship, which supports the
detection model to achieve feature extraction with high performance as shown in Section
4.12.5.
In the previous chapter, a synchronisation-based detection of side channel attacks is
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conducted by comparing three machine learning algorithms PCANN, k-NN and decision tree
algorithms in which decision tree outperformed k-NN and PCANN under various workloads,
light and heavy. It can be noticed how the workloads influence the classifier’s performance
in detecting side channel attacks. The result showed that complex workloads have a negative
impact on classifying side channel attacks.
Regarding robustness, the profiling mechanism is not able to recognise the phases of the
ML; instead, it is an auto mechanism to capture the program execution attributes. Thus, the
MWA algorithm is used to extract the phases of the ML by aggregating the samples of a
phase and then moving the entire data-set to inspect any possibilities of ML phases, which
are attack activities. Because the processor core profiling is an auto mechanism which does
not rely on any means to get information about the processes during their assignment to the
processor cores and there is no prior information about processes during their assignment to
processor cores. Consequently, the identification mechanism is used to acquire the identity
of the attacker. Another benefit of this approach is that the monitoring of program execution
activities for native and cloud processes use the same process. This is because native and VM
processes are executed concurrently using the same hardware resources (e.g. CPU), unless,
in IaaS setting, there is an additional layer in hypervisor which translates virtual addresses
into physical addresses. This results to additional noise to the profiling. Thus, the same
analysis is used for activities in both native and cloud systems with a slight degradation in
the cloud system due to an extra translation layer in hypervisor in cloud systems.
Furthermore, the detection models can identify more than one potential Flush+Reload
attack in the system without having any effect on detection accuracy because multiple attacks
are independently acting in the system and they never overlap or interfere each other. Thus,
they are monitored independently.
Besides this, the identification phase relies on an interrupt and the identification model is
executed only if the detection model detects an attack in the system. Consequently, any mis-
classification will cause interrupts. The more interrupts, the more significant the performance
overhead which is generated in the system. Thus, it is essential that the classification model
be sensitive to correctly detect potential attacks.
4.13 Identification Phase
This section describes the necessary background for implementing matching algorithm
6,which demonstrates how the identification model inspects every single memory transaction
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in real time and how to change the execution path of the malicious program to interrupt
handler when such malicious activities are detected.
4.13.1 Interrupt
An interrupt is an event caused by software interaction with a hardware device. Events may
be received as signals by the CPU when they need its attention. The OS will ignore some
events, but others cause the OS to handle them immediately; the routine that handles this
is called an interrupt handler. Each interrupt handler is designed to respond to a particular
event, and falls into one of two categories; hardware interrupts and software interrupts.
1. Hardware Interrupts: used to provide communication between such hardware de-
vices as mouse, hard disk, keyboard, and the CPU; purposes may, for example, include
advising the operating system of an operation’s completion. Alternatively, by sending
a signal after reading data from the hard disk, a network interface card tells the CPU
about hardware faults. Hardware interrupts are asynchronous and can occur at any
time.
A device is useless without an operating system and kernel. Different types of devices
are connected to the central CPU and each device has different characteristics for
service provision. A device’s performance may be fast or slow, and interrupts enable
their use to be properly organised in response to CPU requests.
2. Software interrupts synchronous with program execution, and falling into three types:
Traps raised by user programs to invoke a system call through the operating system.
As an example, a user who wishes to print characters on the screen will cause the
program to make system calls on the OS, which then displays the character string and
hides the details.
Exceptions are events generated automatically by the CPU when improperly manipu-
lating instructions. Exceptions are of two types. First, there are Faults (such as page
faults) which the CPU can fix (“recover”). Second, Aborts which are irrecoverable
by the CPU. Division by zero would be an example. If this exception occurs in the
program, the program will terminate because the operating system cannot recover from
such a division.
Every CPU in a multi-CPU system has its own dedicated interrupt (INT) pins to receive
interrupt signals from external devices. Each hardware device also has a dedicated Interrupt
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Request (IRQ). When a device needs to communicate with the CPU, it sends the CPU an
interrupt signal through the INT. There are more IRQs in the system than INTs on the CPU,
and so the interrupt signals are not transmitted to the CPU immediately but are subject to a
Programmable Interrupt Controller (PIC) which organises and prioritises communications
requests. The controller sends and responds to requests between specified devices and the
CPU. Having been designed for legacy systems, the PIC is limited in the number of devices it
can handle and therefore incompatible with multiprocessor systems. Modern multiprocessor
systems, with which the PIC was not compatible, instead use Advanced Programmable
Interrupt Controller (APIC) which can handle simultaneous multiple interrupt signals across
CPU cores. APIC comprises two components: Input/Output APIC (IOAPIC); and Local
APIC (LAPIC). Every CPU core has a LAPIC of its own and a motherboard that typically
comprises at least one IOAPIC receiving interrupt signals from external devices before
distributing them between or across CPU core LAPICs. When an external device such
as a keyboard requests an interrupt through IOAPIC, which routes external interrupts to
LAPIC and is integrated with LAPICs, it distributes and prioritises the interrupts among
CPU cores. They communicate by way of Interrupt Messages and Inter-Process Interrupts
(IPI) to distribute interrupts between processors.
The operating system deals with an interrupt either as a masked interrupt or a Non-
Maskable Interrupts (NMI). Receipt of a masked interrupt causes the OS to ignore the
interrupt, which is in effect disabled. A non-maskable interrupt, on the other hand, demands
immediate handling by the OS. A non-maskable interrupt will usually occur only in the event
of a critical hardware fault that will cause a system crash. NMI is generally the method of
diagnosing such faults.
4.13.2 Identification Model
Figure 4.3 depicts the whole process of detection and identification. From step 5, the Process
Identifier Agent (PIA) is the entry point for identification. Let’s assume that the identification
model has received a message from the detection model. PIA acknowledges the Core
Inspector Agent (CIA) to initialise the Trapping procedure. The CIA is a kernel module
which is driver-based and where the trapping procedure listens to an incoming message
from the PIA. The CIA starts to configure PMCs and initialises parameters including the
thresholds, which are obtained by statistical functions in Section 4.11. As it receives the
message, the trapping procedure initialises a loop for_each_online_cpu(cpu) to examine
the online processor cores. This function returns a cpu parameter used by the function msr
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to confirm that the function reads and it is then pinned to the specific processor core. This
is done because, without using wrmsr_safe_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 msr_no,
u32 l, u32 h), there is no guarantee merely from using rdmsr and wrmsr instructions
that the targeted processor core will be read. The CIA then examines each processor core
individually to find the core serving the attack program.
Algorithm 6 Identification Algorithm
1: procedure IDENTIFICATION()
2: threshold, phase,counter
3: for each core: pc in PC do
4: obs = read(PMC)
5: if (obs satisfied thresholds) then
6: counter++
7: if counter > phase then
8: /* ML is identified, the PMC counters are set to -1 to
9: and suspend the MP trigger the interrupt so that
10: direct the execution to the interrupt handler */





A vector of PMC variable vPMC[pc] is created, when pc = the number of PMC, to store
PMC counter values. In the inner loop of the identification algorithm 6, in the first iteration,
the values of PMCs are stored into vMPC0. In the other iterations, the new captured PMC
is averaged with the vPMC content. Until the counter reaches the length of the phase. The
phase variable indicates the minimum length of samples which might occur within one job.
If, say, the number of samples is five then the loop inside the identification procedure takes
five samples and checks the attack pattern by using the threshold parameters discussed in
Sections 4.11.2.1; if there is no match between the vPMC and the attack thresholds, the
loop resets vPMC and continues checking. If, on the other hand, the vPMC values and
the threshold match, this is the process that is causing the attack and the PMC counters
are immediately reset to -1, which is explained in details in Section 3.2.3, to force a PMC
overflow using the current process core. Recall, PMC interrupt is enabled (see Section
4.13.1). The PMC counter overflow causes the OS to suspend the current process assigned to
the current processor core and hands control to the Trapping interrupt handler. Inside the
Trapping interrupt handler, information about the suspended processor core is taken from the
4.13 Identification Phase 111
Processor Control Block (PCB) and passed back to PIA, which will now have the identity of
the malicious process and can take necessary action to find its owner.
4.13.3 Identification Phase Evaluation
This section discusses and evaluates the results obtained from the experiments. To evaluate
the identification, three experiments are conducted in which the only difference is the profiling
settings. What is changed is the number of samples {5, 10, 20} taken by the trapping task.
The number of samples is critical to identification, because more than the threshold causes
the identification model to miss the attacker; or less than the threshold for the identification
model leads to the generation of a False Negative (FN) (detecting normal activities as attack
activities) due to inferring non-attack samples.
Figure 4.19 shows profiling with 1000 samples for each native and cloud Flush+Reload
program. The duration of Flush+Reload program jobs running in native and cloud are
different. The time quantum for the cloud-based jobs is longer than for the native ones. This
duration has an impact on identifying the malicious process activities, which are denoted
in the red and blue horizontal lines. Green boundaries show correct detection of the attack
program by the algorithm; red boundaries show a failure to capture the attack program. The
boundaries are not equal due to the soft scheduler, in which there is flexibility for the jobs to
be completed. By relying on the analysis in Section 4.11.2.1, we can define the minimum
and maximum required time to complete a job. Figure 4.19 shows the difference between the
quanta for native and cloud jobs. Sub-figure (a) shows the scheduler for real-time executions
in user space for a native system. Sub-figure (b) shows the scheduler for real-time execution
of VM and host real time programs in user space. The VM job has a larger quantum than
the native-based jobs. This is because recent work shows that the time quantum for jobs for
VM processes is longer than for jobs in a native system for performance purposes. Thus,
the identification model has more confidence in detecting malicious VM than a native-based
malicious program.
The best attack scenarios for a native Flush+Reload attack are when the identification
model starts at the same time as the jobs of the ML are assigned to the processor core and
start executing. In less likely attack scenarios, the identification model starts in the middle of
the jobs and, in this case, the activities of other workloads will interfere with the observations
and fail in matching.
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Fig. 4.19 The execution time line which is sliced among the attacker in a native system and 4
SPEC workloads. The malicious loop inside Flush+Reload program phases for LLC cache
misses appear as chunks of samples which can be observed as process transactions on a
specific processor core.
4.14 Discussion
None of the detection and prevention techniques so far developed can prevent a side channel
attack from taking place. They can make attacks more difficult to carry out, but they cannot
stop attackers from achieving their malicious aims, because vulnerabilities in hardware and
software allow attackers to find ways round them. Ge et al. (2017) concluded that the most
commonly used current processors, including x86 and ARM processors, are not designed
in such a way as to maintain critical security for the core-processor. lipp2018meltdown
suggests to microprocessor manufacturers that performance should not be the sole aim of
chip design and that they should be more concerned with making communication channels
in the computational environment completely secure.
What stands in the way of side channel attack mitigation is the overheads generated by
protection methods and the fact that implementing those methods is complex. The overheads
in question relate to the fact that operating systems operate on one layer and applications on
another. OS overheads negatively impact on the system, including user programs running on
it, but overheads generated in the application levels affect the targeted applications rather
than the system and its complexity.
The fact is, though, that the majority of proposed side channel attacks and countermea-
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sures against them are reliant on assumptions, the enabling and disabling features being an
example. It follows that building a reliable security model requires study of those vulnerabil-
ities that attackers exploit and of the limitations in the ability of existing countermeasures to
provide security tailored to specific situations.
The classification problem requires more details to improve the solution by addressing
every single mistake made by the model while classifying unseen data. In this study,
classification is the framework’s core task, because 4.12.2 after detecting an attack, the
Detection Agent (DA) sends a message to the Process Identification Agent (PIA) to identify
the attacker. The identification phase relies on an interrupt, so that any mis-classification
will cause interrupts, which leads to the generation of performance overheads. The more
interrupts there are, the more significant are performance overheads generated in the system.
It is therefore essential that the classification model be sensitive for correct detection of an
attack.
As was mentioned in Section 4.5, most attackers are not aware of the organised (repeat-
able) unintentional contentions. For instance, if (Del Pozo et al., 2015) tries to evade the
detection system it is true that a lot of noise will be incurred in the observations; on the other
hand, the detection system is sensible at a degree even if the attacker tries to deviate the
detection system by slowing down the scanning mechanism.
The profiling in this chapter is based on the underlying processor core for which it is
important to know the behaviour or activities of the jobs and the duration of their assignment
to the processor cores. The details are given in Section 4.10. Consequently, program phase
detection mechanisms have been used to efficiently identify the ML loop repetitions and
apply the sum of aggregation function to bound the ML’s execution attributes in one data
point in the data-set before feeding them to the classification algorithms. Consequently,
the program phase supports the classifier to be more reliable and robust in detecting ML
iterations. In this case, the performance overheads of the system are reduced, because fewer
interrupts are triggered.
As the experiment results show, identifying the Flush+Reload program is more guaranteed
while it is running in a cloud rather than a native system. This is because recent work has
shown that the time quantum for jobs of VM processes are longer than for jobs in a native
system. Short time slicing in cloud systems will lead to degradation in the performance of
the system. This will lead to a better chance to monitor malicious VMs with high confidence
to make decisions about detecting and identifying the attacker.
Chapter 5
Conclusions And Future Work
This Chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the utilised methods of the detection
system in real-time systems and the potential direction of future work are discussed.
5.1 Conclusions
This section summarises and discusses the research contributions of the thesis. Further, the
key design of the framework are highlighted in away that they shape the scope of the work.
5.1.1 Research Summary
This work addressed the problem of perplexing approaches in detecting side channel attack
and identifying the attackers in both native and cloud systems by using machine learning
approaches. This problem results in difficulties in confining malicious processes to identify
the attacker. This is particularly in the cloud system in which it is crucial to identify VMs
which achieve side channel attacks. The hypothesis stimulating this work is based on the
possibility to model and analyse complex computational environments concerning user-
defined security in an automated manner.
In this thesis a new framework was developed for system security, which allows operators,
or cloud providers to implement security mechanisms for their consumers. Based on the
improvement of the existing detection systems, the objectives of the proposed framework are
to secure the computational environments from side channel attacks and identify the owner
of the attacker, initiated by Flush+Reload scheme.
The framework is developed on the ground of machine learning algorithms which is
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capable of efficiently detecting side channel attack. This supports identification phase to
disrupt the attack before stealing the entire key bits of secret elements.
5.1.2 Contribution to knowledge
The main finding of this thesis is that machine learning algorithms can mitigate side channel
attacks in host systems. This has been achieved by developing a real-time accurate and fast
prediction system. Previous detection systems relied on the synchronisation between the
victims and attackers’ programs, running concurrently. However, this thesis demonstrates
that the approach of using direct profiling processor cores for any memory transactions had
clear advantages over synchronisation approach. The benefit of the approach, presented in
this thesis, is the ability of detecting all potential Flush+Reload programs in the system as
they are running concurrently in the system.
A profiling mechanism was suggested which is capable of monitoring program execution
attributes at processor cores level to capture the execution of malicious programs by deploying
program phase detection techniques. The statistical analysis introduced to determine the OS’s
scheduler behaviour rely on its uniqueness while detecting both malicious VMs and native
processes at no extra cost to the performance. The uniqueness of the attacker program was
analysed by utilising Descriptive Statistics. Various experiments were conducted to capture
the attacker behaviour in different scenarios to generalise the detection and identification of
such attacks. The profiling mechanism was also able to filter out the system workloads’ noises.
In addition, the program execution instability was addressed through different scenarios
which helped the identification phase by providing thresholds and possibilities of the program
executions in different runs.
The major contribution of this thesis was to bring the program phase detection into
detection system by identifying the fine-grained program execution attributes of Malicious
Loop inside Flush+Reload program in real-time systems. In the processor core profiling level,
it is challenging to identity the malicious processes through the phase detection; the owner of
the attack can be identified without sense of the attacker. Moreover, this thesis demonstrated
the benefit of profiling mechanism to construct the inner loop of ML inside Flush+Reload
program while the processes of the program are fragmented into a significant number of
jobs. Besides, the framework of this thesis benefits from very low overhead performance
approximately less than 1% of the host system.
The source of information, which is the core of the detection system, to investigate the
presence of side channel attack was addressed in this research. The initial analysis showed the
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feasibility of utilising machine learning methods, by comparing the result of three algorithms
to detect side channel attacks with various workloads using SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark
suite. Then the tree algorithm was selected which outperformed the other algorithms in this
environment (PCANN and k-NN). We also explored a range of machine learning techniques
and addressed the limitations of single decision tree algorithms in the context of our work.
The results showed that Random forest, which is the implementation of bagging technique,
has better efficiency than single tree algorithms. The model could significantly be optimised
by utilising bagging technique.
5.2 Limitations
This section describes the limitations of the proposed framework in this research including
both detection and identification phases.
1. The framework presented within this thesis does not only rely on the learning detection
models, but also, in case the detection model fails to detect, the detection system
introduces extra overhead to the system.
2. The framework proposed in this research cannot be generalised for similar attack
such as Prime+Probe. Prime+Probe requires different features to be extracted in time
execution line. However, the same analysis mechanism can be used for other side
channel attack techniques.
3. Attackers can use different processes to achieve the attack. For instance, if Flush+Reload
task is carried out to one process and the rest of the attack tasks on different processes,
then the framework will fail to detect the other processes related to the attacker. How-
ever, by identifying the malicious VMs, another action can take place to detect all
processes belong to the VMs.
5.3 Future Work
Side channel attacks primarily utilise Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe techniques to exploit
hardware and software vulnerabilities. Current work has focused on Flush+Reload attack. In
the future work, we will extend the framework to detect Prime+Probe technique in real-time
systems. Moreover, we believe that hardware-based security rely on HPC has not yet been
explored well. Based on our findings, HPC can be utilised to monitor and extract a small
5.3 Future Work 117
amount of code inside a program precisely. Consequently, HPC can be used to trace attacks
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